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This thesis consists of three empirical studies in the domain of the economics of gender, health 
and happiness. I explore a broad range of topics varying from the effects of the use of headscarves on 
economic outcomes, to organ donation and monetary donation. The second chapter is written with a 
gender perspective. The third and fourth chapters are both about donation behavior. Yet, each of them 
can be read independently. Since this thesis covers a wide area of research, I used data from many 
different countries and cultures such as Turkey, Iran, Syria, Egypt, EU countries and the Netherlands.  
In the first chapter, I provide an overview of the studies by discussing the motivations for the 
studies, providing research questions and summarizing the main findings. The second chapter 
documents differences in educational attainment, labor market outcomes and childbearing for women 
by their use of headscarves and investigates the impact of the headscarf ban on female educational 
attainment, labor force participation and childbearing decisions in Turkey. In Chapter 3, I explore the 
relationship between presumed consent legislation and willingness to donate one’s organs, organ 
donation card holding, actual organ donation rates and transplantation rates. The last chapter looks at 
the relationship between pro-social behavior and subjective wellbeing and tries to quantify the 
happiness effect of donating in the Netherlands. 
1.1 The Turkish Headscarf Ban  
The majority of females in Turkey wear headscarves. However, since 1997, wearing a headscarf 
has been banned in tertiary education and public institutions mainly due to the interpretation that the 
headscarf is not compatible with secularism. Naturally, one can expect to observe the effects of this 
ban on various outcomes for females in Turkey. This ban could have led to increased gender 
inequality because females are supposed to wear the headscarf whereas males are not. Therefore, 
males who share similar ideas with those females who want to wear the scarf can continue higher 
education whereas females cannot. There is evidence that Turkey is doing poorly in terms of gender 
inequality. According to the World Economic Forum’s assessment of gender inequality, Turkey’s was 




Bangladesh, Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain, Algeria and Qatar. According to World Economic Forum (2007), 
Turkey is also below Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia for the educational attainment sub-
category. In economic participation and opportunity category, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Qatar, 
Bangladesh rank higher than Turkey. In other words, Turkey lags behind some Islamic countries in 
terms of gender-based inequalities.  
The headscarf has been a subject of heated and mostly ideological debate in Turkey. Dealing with 
integrating its immigrant population, the headscarf has been also an agenda item for many European 
countries. The motivation for this study is to provide objective information on the effect of the ban 
which hopefully could increase the quality of the debate in Turkey and might give policy makers in 
Europe some idea if they enact or abolish similar laws. We are also motivated by examining a 
potential by-product of the headscarf ban; the childbearing of women who use headscarf.  A large 
body of literature has established the link between education attainment, labor force participation of 
women and their childbearing. If the preference for wearing the headscarf is strong enough (women 
wearing headscarves refuse not to wear it), the headscarf ban policy might give rise to higher fertility 
among headscarved women. This is potentially a side-effect that is not taken into consideration when 
the headscarf ban was enacted in Turkey. 
In this study, we study the impact of the headscarf ban on female educational attainment, labor 
force participation (LFP) and child bearing decisions in Turkey employing two methodologies. Firstly, 
we analyze national aggregate data using difference in differences (DD) methodology with Turkey as 
the treated unit and neighboring countries as the control group. Secondly, national aggregate data is 
analyzed with females as treated and males as the control group. Lastly, we bring suggestive evidence 
from individual level data from five surveys.  
The contribution of this study to the literature is twofold. Although this ban has been in place for 
a considerably long time, no economic analysis has been conducted so far. Firstly, we attempt to 
analyze the ban in terms of consequences for educational attainment, labor market and childbearing. 
Secondly, we are the first to document a large discrepancy in schooling, labor market prospects and 




Ideally, we would need individual level data which has information on headscarf use, educational 
attainment, employment status and childbearing before and after the ban. Unfortunately, we only have 
individual level data for headscarf use after the ban. We can still provide suggestive evidence because 
women who are born after 1980 are fully exposed to the ban, whereas women born before 1976 might 
not be exposed to the ban fully if they did not repeat any grade. Our analysis is based on the 
assumption that women’s religious preferences do not change over time.  
The results from country level analysis using difference in differences methodology suggest that 
the headscarf ban led to a 27% drop in the female to male ratio for tertiary education students, but 
when country specific time trends are added, the effect is no longer statistically significant. Similarly, 
although we find 22% drop in female LFP, when country specific time trends are added, the effect is 
no longer statistically significant. However, we find 0.27 increase in total fertility rate from country 
level analysis which includes country specific time trends.  
The results from national aggregate data using males as control group also did not report any 
significant effect on overall female tertiary education indicators. We observe 3% drop urban LFP rate 
of females and 2% drop in LFP of higher educated females after the introduction of the ban compared 
to males. Both estimates are statistically significant at 10% level.  
Although all individual level data indicate a large educational gap between women wearing 
headscarves and women not wearing headscarves, we did not detect a significant difference for 
tertiary educational attainment of women who were fully exposed to the ban (wearing headscarves 
and born after 1980) compared to women who may not be exposed to the ban (wearing headscarves 
and born between 1973 and 79) assuming standard progression through school. We also documented a 
wide gap in employment status of women by their use of the headscarf. Even after controlling for 
religion-related covariates, the use of headscarf is negatively associated with being employed. Using 
employment history from NFHS-2008, we find that after the enactment of the headscarf ban, 
employment probability dropped by 4.8% for women wearing headscarves. This is more pronounced 
for younger cohort women wearing headscarves. We observe a drop of 5.9% for this group after the 
enactment of the ban. Moreover, using full fertility, employment, marriage, and migration history 




wearing headscarves by 1.4% after the enactment of the ban, although the coefficient is significant at 
10% significance level. We support this effect on fertility by looking at childbearing in the previous 
five years from the time of NFHS-2003 and 2008. Using NFHS-2003, we do not find statistically 
significant effect on short term fertility of women who are fully exposed (wearing headscarves and 
born after 1980). But, we did find statistically significant effect on long-term fertility on women who 
are fully exposed.  
In sum, we did not find any statistically significant effect of the ban on female tertiary educational 
attainment indicators; whereas we did find some effect at the national and individual level on female 
labor force participation indicators and fertility.  Even if one does not consider the consequences of 
the ban for this particular group of women, the unintended byproduct of this ban – an increased 
number of people raised by mothers who prefer to use headscarf – is significant. The main message of 
this study is that when addressing concerns of secularism, the potential effects of banning headscarves 
on women’s educational attainment, employment opportunities and fertility should be considered.  
1.2 Presumed Consent and its Implications for Organ Donation and Transplantation 
The chronic shortage of human organs is leading to premature death of many patients. Therefore, 
identifying factors that have a potential to impact lives of patients with organ failure is important from 
a policy perspective. One policy tool that could be cleverly set for increasing organ donation rates is 
the legislative defaults. Currently, there are two legislative regimes; “informed consent" or opt-in in 
which explicit declaration makes the person a potential organ donor and "presumed consent” or opt-
out in which explicit declaration is required for not being a potential donor. In practice, to avoid 
painful and difficult discussions with families’ of the deceased, in some presumed consent and 
informed consent countries, consent from the family of the deceased is taken which is sometimes 
called “soft opt out” system.   
The organ donation consent rate in the Netherlands, an informed consent country, is 27.5% while 
that of Belgium, a country with a very similar culture and economic development, but which has 
presumed consent regime, has an effective consent rate of 98% (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). These 




For instance, in the Netherlands, the Liberal Democratic Party (D66) proposed to change the defaults 
for organ donation to presumed consent (D66, 2012). 
Our main aim in this study is to examine how institutional setting namely; presumed consent 
impacts cadaveric donations and kidney transplantations using a panel dataset from the EU-27 
countries plus Croatia in the period 2000-2010. Since there is no country which changed legislation in 
the period we consider, we could not estimate country fixed effects which would treat any time-
invariant unobserved country level heterogeneity. In particular, our pooled OLS results for identifying 
the impact of presumed consent would be biased if presumed consent is legislated in countries where 
there is higher social acceptance of organ donation. Therefore, in this study we follow a three step 
approach. We firstly study differences in willingness to donate one’s organs in presumed and 
informed consent countries. If we do not find any statistically significant difference in willingness to 
donate one’s organs in presumed and informed consent countries, there will be less concern for 
pooled OLS analysis. Secondly, we study differences in registering preferences for organ donation in 
presumed and informed consent countries by looking at organ donation card holding behavior. For 
presumed consent to have an impact on organ donation rates, we should observe differences in 
registering behavior. If people do register their preferences for organ donation in case of a mismatch 
between their preferences for organ donation and legislative default, then it is unlikely to observe any 
behavioral effects of presumed consent. The third step which forms our main analysis explores the 
impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric donations and kidney transplantations.  
In the first step, using individual level data from the 2002, 2006, 2009 Eurobarometer Surveys, 
we do not detect any statistically significant relationship between willingness to donate and presumed 
consent legislation even after controlling for socio-economic background indicators. These findings 
imply that presumed consent legislation is not necessarily enacted in countries where there is wide 
social acceptance of organ donation. This is a useful first step which is necessary but not sufficient 
condition for claiming that the difference in organ donation outcomes between presumed consent 
countries and informed consent countries is due to presumed consent legislation.  
In the second step, we examine organ donation card holding from Eurobarometer 2006 survey. In 




willing to donate their organs in presumed consent countries. Surprisingly, among people who are not 
willing to donate, we do not observe higher registration in presumed consent countries. These findings 
suggests that presumed consent can increase cadaveric donation rates because people who are not 
willing to donate their organs fail to register their preferences in presumed consent countries.  
In our main analysis, using international organ donation registry data, we find that presumed 
consent countries have 28 to 32% higher cadaveric donation and 27 to 31% higher kidney transplant 
rates in comparison to informed consent countries after accounting for potential confounding factors.  
Although previous studies also found higher cadaveric organ donation rates in the presumed 
consent countries compared to informed consent countries, there is no consensus about the underlying 
mechanism. Some researchers (the first group) attribute higher cadaveric organ donation rates to the 
effect of presumed consent legislation whereas others (the second group) see the presumed consent 
legislation as an indicator of a country’s commitment to organ donation. Mainly, the first group of 
studies is criticized on the ground that they did not address unobserved heterogeneity adequately. That 
is, the results could be due to the presumed consent legislation being enacted in countries where there 
is higher social acceptance of organ donation.  
This study contributes to the literature in some important ways. We firstly address potential 
endogeneity of presumed consent by showing evidence that presumed consent is not necessarily 
legislated in countries where there is higher social acceptance of organ donation. To address 
unobserved heterogeneity even better, we group countries according to their geographic, ethnic, 
cultural, and organ donation related cooperation. We then identify the impact of presumed consent 
running country group fixed effects models. The results still show higher cadaveric donation rates in 
presumed consent counties which suggest that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity ultimately 
appears to have little effect.  
Secondly, we address the claim that presumed consent is an indicator of a country’s commitment 
to organ donation rather than a causal mechanism in itself. We show that after taking into account a 
country’s commitment to organ donation proxied by kidney transplant centers as an additional control 
variable, the coefficient of presumed consent is still statistically significant and it even increases. 




distrust in the system and scare of manipulation of the human body are three major causes of refusal 
for organ donation, previous studies have not dealt with trust in the system and religion differences 
adequately. Abadie and Gay (2005) include religion with a Catholic country indicator which is based 
on majority of population being Catholic or not. To capture trust in the system, we included 
corruption perceptions scores from Transparency International. To control for religiosity changes over 
time, we compiled percentage of population being Roman Catholic and having no religion mainly 
from International Social Survey Program (ISSP), European Social Survey (ESS), European Values 
Survey (EVS) and Eurobarometers conducted between 1999/2000 and 2010. Lastly, to the author’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the impact of presumed consent on kidney transplantation 
which is more relevant from a policy perspective.  
1.3 Warm Glow 
Why do people give away their money or time for free? One potential reason for pro-social 
behavior is that people get psychological benefits from helping others out, the so-called “warm glow” 
motivation. To put the warm glow into context, we have to make a distinction between pure altruism 
and impure altruism at this point. Economists describe a person as pure altruist if she only cares for 
the final situation of the other person regardless of what she personally did for the other person, 
whereas an impure altruist would enjoy not only the final situation but also enjoys her own altruistic 
deed. In large economies, the warm-glow motive must dominate at the margin (Ribar & Wilhelm, 
2002). The intuition is that the incentive to free ride must be so overwhelming if large numbers of 
others are collectively providing a substantial amount of charity, the only justification for giving is 
that donors get some direct benefit from giving. 
Initially, Andreoni (1989) hypothesized “warm glow” to explain incomplete crowding out when 
the government increases contributions to charity. Later on, the economics literature focused on 
measuring the extent of crowding out to demonstrate the existence of the warm glow. However, to the 
author’s knowledge there is no empirical study which looks at the relationship between donation and 




If the warm glow hypothesis is correct, we should observe higher subjective wellbeing after 
donation among donors. Higher subjective wellbeing after donation is also consistent with both pure 
and impure altruism. 
There is a large psychology literature on the pro-social behavior and happiness relationship. The 
literature suggests three mechanisms for this relationship. Firstly, engaging in donation could cause 
increased happiness. It is also possible that shocks to happiness could lead to higher donations. 
Moreover, personality characteristics could be driving both happiness and donation. To date, evidence 
on the first mechanism from psychology literature has been largely based on experimental studies 
with relatively small sample sizes and unrealistic amounts donated. Thus, whether donating actually 
causes happiness remains partly unanswered.  
If warm glow is an important channel driving pro-social behavior, this could have a lot of 
implications for policy making. Firstly, one can ask whether there should be tax-break advantages for 
donations since donors are supposed to get utility from donation anyway. Secondly, this information 
could also be used for promoting donation.  
In this study, we examine pro-social behavior in the form of making donations and try to measure 
the magnitude of “warm-glow” motivation. We test this theoretical argument empirically by using 
happiness scores as dependent variable from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences 
(LISS), subjective health scores from the Giving in the Netherlands panel (GINP) datasets and life 
satisfaction scores from the single available wave of the GINP in 2006. To account for endogeneity of 
donation decisions, we exploit variation in different types of solicitation by charities.  
Donating an extra Euro and engaging in donation are our variables of interest. We initially discuss 
fixed effects regression results from the LISS panel, which primarily measure long-term effects.  
Secondly, we discuss regression results from fixed effects, OLS and IV specifications from the GINP 
panel respectively.  
From the LISS panel, we do not find any statistically significant relationship between an extra 
Euro donated and happiness scores after accounting for individual fixed effects; whereas we find 
evidence that engaging in donation is associated with higher happiness scores after taking into 




nor engaging in donation on subjective health using fixed effects specifications. We find a concave 
relationship between donating an extra Euro and life satisfaction using the OLS method for the single 
available wave of the GINP in 2006 whereas from the same dataset using the OLS, we do not detect 
any significant relationship between engaging in donation and life satisfaction. Contrary to intuition, 
the IV estimates show a negative effect of donating an extra Euro on subjective health. When 
experience of certain diseases is taken into account, the effect is no longer significant. This suggests 
that being solicited is negatively correlated with health status. Lastly, the IV estimates from single 
available wave of the GINP suggests that an extra Euro donation increases life satisfaction 
significantly. IV estimates of the effect of an extra one Euro donation on self-reported health being 
negative and IV estimates of the effect of an extra Euro donation on life satisfaction being positive is 
at odds with each. This suggests that solicitation reflecting selection cannot explain the results that we 
observe for life-satisfaction.  
To put the findings from the IV methodology into context, one can convert the effect of donation 
into monetary units by comparing it with the coefficient of income. Our findings from the IV strategy 
suggest that an increase of €1 in donations increased life satisfaction as much as a €104 increase in 
income from employment. At first, the effect might seem implausible. However, the results show the 
local average treatment effect (LATE) for individuals who donate an extra Euro because they are 
solicited and these individuals would not donate this extra Euro if they were not solicited.  This group 
of individuals is not likely to be representative of the Dutch population. Thus, the IV estimates might 
not reflect the average treatment effect. Therefore, extrapolation is not meaningful.   
For discussing the policy implications, the average treatment effect would be more useful. 
Nevertheless, the main message of this study - donation makes at least some people happier-, could 
have policy implications for boosting charitable giving under certain assumptions. Assuming 
rationality, people are thought to make optimal decisions in which they are supposed to take into 
account the psychological benefits of donating in their utility function. At first, since a large number 
of people already donated and people can learn the psychological benefits of donation over time, 
rationality seems to be a valid assumption. Rationality assumption does not leave room for advertising 




overlook the benefits of charitable giving. Dunn, Aknin and Norton (2008) showed that people 
erroneously thought that personal spending would make them happier than pro-social spending 
although they found higher happiness levels of randomly assigned pro-social spenders.  Frank (2004) 
discusses the evidence on how people do not spend their money in ways that yield significant and 
lasting increases in measured satisfaction. Therefore, if rationality assumption does not hold in the 
context of pro-social behavior, there might be still room for increasing subjective wellbeing by 
engaging in pro-social behavior. However, for now, whether people rationally expect these 


















2 Unveiling the Veil: Implications of the Turkish Headscarf Ban 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1997, there was a sharp policy change in Turkey that could potentially have large negative 
effects on women’s education attainment and employment opportunities: the headscarf, a religious 
and cultural artifact, was prohibited in universities and public institutions. As a result of this ban, 
women in universities and women working as civil servants were forced to resign or drop out of their 
schools if they refused to uncover their heads.  
This ban is not a minor policy change if one considers that, according to Carkoglu & Toprak 
(2006), 63.5% of females in Turkey wear some sort of headscarf. According to Konda’s survey, 
conducted in 2007, 69.6% of women in Turkey wore headscarves. Similarly, A&G’s surveys found 
that the percentage of households in which women did not wear headscarves was 21.5 and 16.6 in 
2003 and 2007, respectively. Another indicator that shows the magnitude of the problem is that 24.5% 
of the respondents in the study of Carkoglu & Toprak (2006) said they would disapprove if their 
daughter did not wear a headscarf in order to continue her education in a university.
1
 Again, 26.1% of 
the respondents in Konda’s 2007 survey reported that they would prefer their daughters to forgo their 
university education rather than agree not to wear a headscarf. Certainly, these figures reflect that 
some part of Turkish society puts considerable emphasis on the use of the headscarf.  
This ban was not enacted as a result of societal consensus but was implemented as a result of a 
National Security Council meeting
2
 without much discussion in the public before the decision.
3
 The 
Turkish military was concerned that the headscarf is not compatible with secularism. Because of the 
complex power relations between the government and the military, it was possible that the decisions 
taken at that particular meeting were applied without any major objection. The focus of this paper is 
not to examine how this policy came into place, but to explore its implications. 
                                                   
1
 “If you had a daughter wearing headscarf, would you approve of her not using a headscarf in order to continue 
her university education?” 
2
 National Security Council is composed of government representatives, the president and representatives from 
the military. 
3
 There were events before that Security Council meeting at that time which were considered dangerous for the 
future of the country, mainly by the military. That meeting and those decisions had far-reaching consequences 




The majority of the public opposes the headscarf ban in schools and the public sphere.
 
Research 
conducted by Carkoglu & Toprak (2006) shows that 67.9% of the public believes that female civil 
servants should be able to wear the headscarf, if they want to
4
. Moreover, according to Konda (2007), 
78% of the respondents are against the headscarf ban in the universities.   
Our study is the first to document the relationships between schooling, labor market prospects and 
childbearing dispersion and the use of a headscarf in Turkey. This study provides policy makers in 
other countries a clearer understanding of implications of enacting or abolishing similar laws. The 
headscarf ban is an issue not only in Turkey but also in other countries. For instance, France has 
enacted a similar law but not in higher education institutions. Teachers wearing headscarves has also 
become an issue in Germany (Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
On the one hand, it might seem natural that this policy change will affect educational attainment 
of women who prefer to use the headscarf. However, the effect depends on the strength of the 
individual's preference for the use of the scarf. Wearing a headscarf in itself could also be affected by 
the ban.   
One can also expect that educational restrictions on this large group will be reflected in their labor 
market outcomes. That is, fewer females would be able to enter higher end of the labor market since 
they would not be able to get higher education. On the other hand, those women who cannot continue 
tertiary education might enter into the labor force earlier, in the lower end of the labor market. 
Therefore, theoretically speaking, the effect of the ban on female labor force participation is 
ambiguous.  
Moreover, a large body of literature has established the link between employment, education and 
childbearing: lower levels of employment and education lead to higher birthrates. If the preference for 
wearing the headscarf is strong and leads many women away from work and/or education, this policy 
might give rise to higher fertility among headscarved women. Ultimately, whether the ban affects 
behavioral outcomes is an empirical question. Therefore, in this paper, we try to identify the impact of 
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 Also, 70.4 % of respondents would not be disturbed by a female teacher wearing a headscarf in the classroom 




headscarf ban in Turkey on higher educational attainment of women, labor force participation and 
their childbearing.   
Although this ban has been in place for a considerably long time, no economic analysis has been 
conducted so far. Cindoglu (2010) studied the headscarf ban through in-depth interviews with a focus 
group of 79 women. But, the group was not representative and the number of observations was small 
due to the nature of that study. According to Kaynakoglu & Toprak (2004), the percentage of students 
who could not continue higher education because of the headscarf ban is only 1%. However, there are 
several flaws in that study. First of all, although this question is about possible reasons for not 
continuing to higher education, one category of answer is “currently student” (9.8%). It is ambiguous 
whether this 9.8% are high-school students or university students. In any case, this 9.8% is irrelevant 
for analyzing the reasons for not being able to transfer to higher education institutions. Moreover, 
10.5% of respondents said that their parents would not allow them to continue on to higher education. 
Similarly, 49.2% of the female students’ reason for not continuing secondary education is “my parents 
did not allow me.” There could be many reasons for some parents not letting their daughters to 
continue higher education. But one strong consideration for conservative parents is the headscarf ban. 
There are definitely high costs for getting higher education (such as the time and money involved in 
entrance examinations, expenses for living, accommodation, tuition and other school fees plus 
opportunity costs etc.) However, among conservative parents, many would be reluctant to invest in 
their daughter’s education if it meant ceasing to wear the headscarf. Lastly, the main topic of 
Kaynakoglu & Toprak (2004) is not the headscarf ban, but rather the status of women in the labor 
market, senior management and politics. They only asked one question about reasons for not 
continuing higher education, which is not sufficient to evaluate the ban. Carkoglu & Toprak (2006) 
and Konda's (2007) studies did not look into the effects of the ban but rather at how the ban is 
perceived in society. Therefore, we cannot know from this study how the headscarf ban affects 
educational attainment, labor force participation and childbearing rate of women.  
Ideally, we would need individual level data which has information on headscarf use, educational 
attainment, employment status and childbearing before and after the ban. Unfortunately, we only have 




women who are born after 1980 are fully exposed to the ban, whereas women born before 1976 might 
not be exposed to the ban fully if they did not repeat any grade. However, we observe headscarf use 
status for once at the time of the survey. Unfortunately, we cannot make an analysis how wearing 
headscarves has changed after the ban since there is no information about the use of headscarves 
before the ban. Our analysis is based on the assumption that women’s religious preferences do not 
change over time. This assumption is based on evidence from World Values survey. Details of which 
are discussed in Table B-1 in Appendix B.  Moreover, we have descriptive information from a survey 
conducted by Anar Research Company in 2007 about the strength of preference for the use of 
headscarves with the ban. According to that survey, 41% of women who wore scarves at the time of 
the ban continued to wear the scarf, 35% uncovered their heads in places where the ban was enforced, 
and 20% continued their education by using wigs or hats as an alternative, so that their natural hairs 
were not visible (Hazar Group, 2007). Furthermore, we did not find any evidence that women who are 
fully exposed to the ban (born after 1980) use headscarves less often using NFHS-2003 & 2008. 
Details of which are provided in Table B-2 of Appendix B. 
We study the impact of the headscarf ban employing two methodologies. Firstly, we analyze 
country level aggregate data using difference in differences (DD) methodology with Turkey as the 
treated unit and neighboring countries as the control group. Secondly, we provide the effect of the ban 
on females by using males as a control group using national aggregate data. Lastly, we bring 
suggestive evidence using individual level data from five surveys.  
To evaluate the impact of the ban on tertiary education, the female to male ratio in total number of 
students are studied at an aggregate level, and university or higher degree attainment is studied using 
individual level data. For analyzing the impact of the ban on labor market, we focus on female labor 
force participation rate at an aggregate level, and employment status at the individual level. We also 
examined total fertility rate at an aggregate level and childbearing at the individual level. The data for 
most of the aggregate level analysis is obtained from World Bank datasets. Our individual level data 
comes from five surveys which contain information on educational attainment, employment status, 




surveys conducted in 2003 and 2007, and the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) conducted 
in 2003 and 2008. A more detailed explanation of the data is provided in Appendix A.  
The results from country level analysis using difference in differences methodology suggest that 
the headscarf ban led to a 27% drop in the female to male ratio for tertiary education students, but the 
effect is no longer statistically significant, when country specific time trends are added. Similarly, 
although we find 22% drop in female LFP, the effect is no longer statistically significant with country 
specific time trends specification. However, we find 0.27 increase in total fertility rate which includes 
country specific time trends.  
The results from national aggregate data using males as control group also did not report any 
significant effect on overall female tertiary education indicators whereas urban LFP rate of females 
and LFP of higher educated females are impacted with the introduction of the ban compared to males. 
Both estimates are statistically significant at 10% level.  
Descriptive statistics from all individual level data indicate a large educational gap between 
women wearing headscarves and women not wearing headscarves. However, we did not detect a 
significant difference for tertiary educational attainment of women who were fully exposed to the ban 
(wearing headscarves and born after 1980) compared to women who may not be exposed to the ban 
(wearing headscarves and born between 1973 and 79) assuming standard progression through school. 
We also documented a wide gap in employment status of women by their use of the headscarf. Even 
after controlling for religion-related covariates, the use of headscarf is negatively associated with 
being employed. Using employment history from NFHS-2008, we find that after the enactment of the 
headscarf ban, employment probability dropped by 4.8% and 5.9% drop for all women and younger 
cohort women wearing headscarves respectively after the enactment of the ban. Moreover, using full 
fertility, employment, marriage, and migration history from NFHS-2008, we observe an increased 
childbearing probability for younger cohort women wearing headscarves by 1.4% after the enactment 
of the ban, although the coefficient is significant at 10% significance level. We support this effect on 
fertility by looking at childbearing in the previous five years from the time of NFHS-2003 and 2008. 




are fully exposed (wearing headscarves and born after 1980). But, we did find statistically significant 
effect on long-term fertility on women who are fully exposed to the ban.  
In short, we did not detect any statistically significant effect of the ban on female tertiary 
educational attainment indicators; whereas we did find some effect at the national and individual level 
on female labor force participation indicators and fertility. Even if one does not consider the 
consequences of the ban for this particular group of women, the unintended byproduct of this ban – an 
increased number of people raised by mothers who prefer to use headscarf – is significant. The main 
message of this study is that, the potential effects of banning headscarves on women’s educational 
attainment, employment opportunities and fertility should be considered when addressing concerns of 
secularism.  
2.2 Background of the Headscarf Ban 
The first time the headscarf became an issue was in 1964, in Istanbul University’s graduation 
ceremony. A female student wearing a headscarf who graduated with the highest GPA was not 
allowed to speak to the audience, although traditionally the student with the highest GPA would give 
a speech in the graduation ceremony (Cindoglu, 2010). 
Although there were one or two incidents until 1980s, the use of the headscarf in universities did 
not become a problem until the 1980s, because there were only a small number of women in higher 
education. Among them, women who wore a headscarf were even fewer.  
The first regulation about the headscarf was put into effect in 1981 by the Ministry of Education 
(MONE), in the “Dress Codes for schools under supervision of MONE and other Ministries.” In the 
Official Newspaper, “Resmi Gazete” in Turkish, where amendments to laws and regulations are 
published, the new regulation explicitly mentioned that the dresses of women should be clean, tidy, 
ironed, hairs should be combed and inside the institution, the head should not be covered (Official 
Newspaper, 1981). This regulation covers all students in schools under the control of MONE, which 
effectively means all schools in Turkey.  
The dress code for women working in public institutions which contains articles that women’s 




regulation of MONE was amended so that tertiary education institutions were taken out of the dress 
code regulation (Official Newspaper, 1982). But, with the establishment of the Higher Educational 
Council (HEC) in 1982, the new “contemporary” dress codes for tertiary education institutions again 
stated explicitly that “the head should be visible or open and the headscarf should not be used in the 
institutions” (HEC, 1982). Due to this regulation, some universities prohibited the use of headscarf 
very strictly, whereas some of them sort of closed their eyes. The prohibition was implemented 
differently in different universities, rather than being implemented in a uniform manner throughout 
the country. However, it is hard to find any data for this time period, because university presidents 
had discretion to apply the ban. 
Over time, student protests led the HEC to circulate a memorandum to universities in 1984 that 
would let tertiary education students to wear the headscarf in a “modern” way (HEC, 1984). In 1987, 
article 7/h had been added to the Student Discipline Code of the tertiary education institutions by the 
HEC, which required students to wear so-called “modern” dresses in classrooms, laboratories, clinics 
and corridors of institutions, and also mentioned that neck and hairs could be clothed with a headscarf. 
(Official Newspaper, 1987). In 1988, the headscarf became legally free with the enactment of law no 
3511 by the Turkish parliament. The president signed the new law and put it into effect (Official 
Newspaper, 1988). Then, the president applied to the Constitutional Court for the added article about 
the headscarf, and the Constitutional Court annulled the article that allowed headscarves to be used. 
Again, in December 1989, HEC amended the Student Discipline Code and the part about the dress 
code was removed from the Student Discipline Code (Official Newspaper, 1989). This marks the 
beginning of a relatively free period of wearing headscarves in tertiary education and public 
institutions.  
Turkey entered a new phase with the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997. 18 
decisions were taken to prevent the breaching of the principle of secularism in the constitution 
(National Security Council, 1997). Although the headscarf is not explicitly mentioned in any of the 
decisions, the 13th decision was related to the so-called modern way of dressing
5
. Headscarves have 
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been interpreted as against secularism and a modern way of dressing. Therefore, the use of 
headscarves in the universities was prohibited very strictly nationwide right after the decisions. In the 
meantime, there were no laws enacted which explicitly outlawed the headscarf
6
. The ban was 
enforced solely by the National Security Council decisions, which were taken in one meeting without 
much discussion in the public before the decision. In 2008, there were lawsuits against the headscarf 
ban in universities; the Supreme Court decided that the ban should be enforced on the ground that the 
use of headscarves violates the principle of secularism in the constitution.   
When it comes to the level of enforcement, particularly after 28th of February 1997, female 
students wearing a headscarf were prohibited to enter university campuses. Together with physical 
interference in case of attempts, there were also psychological pressures. For instance, in Istanbul 
University, so called “persuasion rooms” were formed in order to convince students with headscarves 
already admitted to the universities by passing the University Entrance Examination not to wear it 
anymore (Cindoglu, 2010). Female students wearing headscarves organized protests, some of which 
resulted in police forces arresting protestors. For civil servants, according to AK-DER (2010), 
between 1998 and 2002, 5,000 women who wore a headscarf were sacked and 10,000 have been 
forced to quit, because going to work with a headscarf was considered as misbehavior or disobedience.  
In 2006, “Civil Servants Amnesty” was put into effect which grants civil servants who conducted 
misbehavior a release from punishment. (Official Newspaper, 2006). Therefore, those headscarved 
women who had been expelled from their jobs were given another chance to get back their jobs if they 
would agree not to wear the headscarf anymore.  
Moreover, apart from an impact on the labor market through educational restrictions, there have 
been also more direct limitations in employment opportunities in the public sector for headscarved 
women. From 2000 onwards, women who are candidates for being civil servants have been obliged to 
enter placement examinations “with uncovered heads.” Secondly, in professions requiring 
practitioners to be registered to professional organizations, such as doctors, pharmacists, dentists, 
lawyers, and notaries, the professional Chambers and Unions have issued circulars outlawing the 
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headscarf. Implementation of these policies also restricts private employment possibilities for 
headscarved women whenever there is a contact with a public institution. Cindoglu (2010) discusses 
the propagation of the ban to the private sector through in-depth interviews conducted with women 
wearing a headscarf and their labor market experiences.  
Figure 2-1: Timeline of Events Related to the Headscarf Ban  
 
As mentioned in the first section, a headscarf ban is also a relevant topic for other countries. For 
instance, Tunisia also has banned the headscarf in public schools and universities or government 
buildings since 1981 (Dunbar, 2009), whereas Syria banned full face veils in universities from July 
2010 (Chick, 2010). This issue is also a hotly debated topic in Europe. At the EU level, the European 
Court of Human Rights has ruled that headscarves might legitimately be restricted in EU countries 
(Vakulenko, 2007). On the other hand; Franco Frattini, who was the European Commissioner in 2006, 
has said that he was not in favor of banning full-face veils
7
. At the government level, France is the 
first country in Europe to implement a headscarf ban since September 2004 with law no 2004-228. It 
bans wearing all conspicuous religious symbols in French public primary and secondary schools.  
In Belgium, some municipalities apply a ban only to full-face veils (Mardell, 2006). Alain 
Destexhe is a Belgian senator who proposed a bill that would ban headscarves from all state schools. 
There were two incidents about full-face veils in the UK. For one of the cases, the House of Lords 
stressed that this judgment cannot be generalized to address whether Islamic dress is allowed or not in 
UK. Therefore, we can say that in general, headscarves are allowed in the UK. In Germany, female 
Muslim teachers wearing headscarves have become an issue (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Norway 






has interpreted the headscarf ban as violating its “Gender Equality Act” (Skjeie, 2006). In the 
Netherlands, although in general, government allows its employees to wear a headscarf without much 
ado, there still have been some controversies about the acceptability of the headscarf in both public 
institutions and private enterprises (Saharso, 2007). Some of these cases were brought before the 
Commission of Equal Treatment. In December 2005, in nearly all cases where it has been consulted, 
the Commission has ruled that wearing headscarf cannot be banned because it violates the Dutch anti-
discrimination law. The extreme-right parliamentarian Geert Wilders suggested the Minister of Justice 
to implement a ban of wearing headscarves for all public officers, yet it was rejected (Saharso, 2007). 
Currently, the headscarf is not banned in the Netherlands.  
Both France and Turkey banned use of headscarves as discussed earlier. However, the differences 
between Turkey and France in terms of the potential effect of the ban are considerable. Firstly, in 
France, only public schools are affected by this provision. However, in Turkey, all types of schools, 
including private schools, are in the coverage of the ban. Moreover, in France, the ban is only applied 
in primary and secondary schools, which might not really affect educational attainment of Muslim 
women, because according to religious rules, females are supposed to wear it when they enter into 
adolescence. However, in Turkey, the ban is also applied in tertiary education institutions, which 
means that some conservative female adults may not continue their education if they do not want to 
uncover. Furthermore, in France, on some occasions the costs of private schooling of students who 
would not accept the ban on religious symbols were thus paid for by the state rather than those 
families. In addition, the French government operates a distance learning agency, the CNED, which is 
another solution for families impacted by the rules of public schools. Distance education is also an 
option in Turkey, but that is not trouble-free for women with headscarves either
8
.  
2.3 The Secondary and Tertiary Education System of Turkey 
In Turkey, secondary education consists of three-year general high schools (after 2009, four years) 
and three or four-year vocational high schools. In secondary schools where English is the language of 
education, there is one additional year of language preparation. General high schools offer a 
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curriculum preparing students for university education, whereas vocational high schools offer 
technical education preparing students for vocational higher education within the tertiary system. 
Tertiary education is composed of two or four-year vocational higher education programs and four-
year (six years for medicine) programs that grant undergraduate degrees.  
There exists an excess demand for tertiary education. Therefore, high school students in their final 
year take part in centrally administered competitive national examination to enter a university. As of 
2011, 1,759,998 students have applied to University Entrance Examination, and 789,167 have been 
granted admission, which corresponds to 44.8%. (MSPC, 2011). Since entrance to tertiary education 
institutions is highly competitive, as of 2011, 4,170 private tutorial centers operate all over the 
country and prepare high school students explicitly for university entrance examination (Ministry of 
Education, 2011). Usually, high school students attend private tutorials after school or at weekends for 
sixteen hours a week on average. Another statistic that tells the importance of private tutorial centers 
is that as of 2002, 4.47% of all educational expenditure, including public educational expenditure, 
goes to private tutorial centers (TURKSTAT, 2002). Moreover, 10.07% of all educational expenditure 
by households is on private tutorial centers for university placement exam preparation in 2002 
(TURKSTAT, 2002). As of 2011, one year registration to private tutorial centers costs between 1,500 
TL [€ 750] to 3,500 TL [€1,750].  
Another aspect of the cost of getting a university degree is tuition fees to be paid. Tuition fee 
levels in public institutions are centrally set, and all universities charge the same amount of tuition fee 
for the same programs. Private universities are free to determine their tuition fees. Student and 
parental contribution to the tuition fees of tertiary education in public institutions in Turkey ranges 
from 950 TL [€475] to 4,100 TL [€ 2,050].  
The second component of the cost of tertiary education is living expenses. A sizeable portion of 
the students are also eligible for living in the subsidized public dormitories, where they only pay about 
one-third of the total cost (Eurydice, 2008). For the 2005-2006 academic year, The International 
Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project (ICHEFAP, 2009) estimated tertiary 
education expenses born by parents and students including living and school related expenses as 2,673 




entrance to a university and obtaining a degree requires a significant amount of time and monetary 
investment on the level of student as well as by the parents.  
2.4 The Impact on Female Tertiary Educational Attainment 
In this section, we explore the effect of the ban by comparing tertiary educational indicators with 
Turkey’s neighbors and also comparing female tertiary educational attainment figures with that of 
males in Turkey and lastly we look the effect of the ban on women wearing headscarves.  
2.4.1 Aggregate Country Level Analysis  
To get an overall impression of the impact of the ban, we need an appropriate control group. We 
use Turkey’s neighbors Iran and Syria
9
 as a control group because of geographic proximity, similar 
GDP per capita figures as of 1990, and the majority Muslim population. In terms of geographic 
proximity, one can also think of Greece and Bulgaria, however, GDP per capita in Greece was almost 
four times higher than Turkey as of 1990. Although Bulgaria is also a neighbor and had comparable 
GDP per capita figures as of 1990, it is a predominantly Orthodox-Christian country (CIA, 2012). 
Iran’s GDP per capita is very close to that of Turkey’s. Syrian per capita GDP is much lower, but one 
similar aspect is that both Turkey and Syria are predominantly Sunni-Islam countries while Iran is 
Shia-Muslim country. (CIA, 2012). We focus on the female to male ratio in total number of tertiary 
education students from Iran and Syria for 1990-2008 period. The female to male ratio in total number 
of tertiary education students for all countries is obtained from World Bank’s database
10
 to avoid 
incomparability
11
 whenever possible. Although the data from different countries might not be plagued 
with different data definitions and sample selection procedures, comparing countries is essential for 
our analysis and using the available data is our best option.    
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 Egypt could not be included because there were only two observations for Egypt in 1990 and 1991.  
10
 World Bank refers to United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute 
for Statistics as source of data. UNESCO refers to school register, school survey or census for data on enrolment 
by level of education; population census or estimates for school-age population for calculation of the statistics. 
Again, these figures are also officially submitted data by national authorities.  
11
 UNESCO claims that it provides well-defined standards to ensure data comparability in national and 




Figure 2-2: Female to Male Ratio in Tertiary Education Students 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Figure 2-2 presents female to male ratio in number of tertiary education students in Turkey, Syria 
and Iran before and after the headscarf ban enactment. According to Figure 2, pre-1997 trends in 
female to male ratio in tertiary education students in Iran and Syria are parallel to the pre-1997 trends 
in Turkey. Table C-1 in Appendix C provides descriptive statistics of the ratio of females to males in 
tertiary education students for the countries we analyze. According to Table C-1, Turkey fares better 
before 1997. However, it falls back after 1997 period.  
We run fixed effects models to see the significance of the descriptive statistics. The identifying 
assumption for the results provided in Table 2-1 is that Turkey, Iran and Syria would have followed a 
parallel path in female/male students in tertiary education in the absence of the headscarf ban. In other 
words, the growth in ratio of females to males in tertiary education would have been the same in these 
countries, had no headscarf ban been introduced.  
According to model (1), the headscarf ban resulted in a 27%
12
 drop in the female to male ratio in 
tertiary education students in Turkey compared to Iran and Syria. When country specific time trends
13
 
are added in model (2), the effect of the ban has become statistically insignificant. In model (3), we 
estimate the model with a common trend for Syria and Turkey, since there is no marked difference 












































































between Syrian and Turkish trend in model (2). In model (4), the lagged effect of the ban is estimated. 
Although the ban is estimated to lead to a drop of 2% in tertiary education students’ female to male 
ratio, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Table 2-1: Fixed Effects Estimates of log Female/Male Ratio 
 Total Number of Students 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Ban 0.54*** 0.05 0.04  
 (8.13) (1.32) (1.28)  
Ban*Treatment -0.32*** -0.06 -0.04  
 (-2.90) (-1.04) (-1.16)  
Lagged Ban    0.09*** 
    (2.77) 
Lagged Ban*Treatment    -0.02 
    (-0.61) 
Trend-Iran  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
  (20.57) (23.11) (22.05) 
Trend-Turkey  0.02***   
  (5.99)   
Trend-Syria  0.02***   
  (5.59)   
Trend-   0.02*** 0.02*** 
(Turkey&Syria)   (8.25) (6.42) 
Country Dummies + + + + 
N 52 52 52 48 
R-sqr 0.61 0.97 0.97 0.97 
2.4.2 Analysis of Aggregate National Data  
One can also study the impact of the ban on female educational attainment using males as a 
control group. Figure 2-3 shows the gross tertiary schooling rate
14
 for males and females in Turkey. 
Figure 2-4 shows new admissions and graduation rates
15
, which represent the flow in and out of 
tertiary education. According to Figure 2-3 and 2-4, pre-1997 trends for males are comparable to that 
of females.  
According to Figure 2-3 and 2-4, even after 1997 period, the female and male gross schooling 
rates as well as female and male new admissions rates continued to follow a similar path, which 
suggests that the ban did not impact female new admissions considerably. However, the female 
graduate rate has leveled off for 4 years, starting with 1996/97 academic year.  
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 Gross tertiary schooling rate is defined as total number of students in a tertiary education as a percentage of 
20-24 year old population. 
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 New admissions rate is calculated as dividing total new admissions by 20-24 year old population figures and 





Figure 2-3: Tertiary Education Indicators in Turkey
 
Source: National Education Statistics, TURKSTAT 
Figure 2-4: New Admissions and Graduates of Tertiary Education Institutions 
 
Source: HEC Stastics Yearbooks and National Education Statistics, TURKSTAT 
In Table 2-2, fixed effects estimates of total number of students and graduates rates
16
 are 
displayed.  According to model (1), the headscarf ban resulted in a 7% drop female tertiary education 
students compared to males, but the effect is not statistically significant. In model (2), gender specific 
time trends are added. Again, the effect of the ban is statistically insignificant. In model (3), we 
estimate the model with a common trend for males and females, since there is no marked difference 
between female and male trend in model (2). Similar models are also run for graduates rates. We did 
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 Similar analysis is conducted for new admissions rate, but for the sake of saving space, they are not displayed 
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not find any statistically significant effect of the ban on females compared to males in Table 2-2. 
Since there is excess demand for tertiary education, females wearing headscarves could easily be 
replaced by those who are not wearing headscarves. In short, we did not detect any effect of the ban 
on aggregate tertiary education indicators using neighboring countries as control group and males as 
control group.  
Table 2-2: Fixed Effects Estimates of Tertiary Education Indicators 
 Total Number of Students Graduates Rates 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ban 10.59*** -3.54** -3.31*** 3.96*** 1.71*** 1.50*** 
 (4.55) (-2.54) (-2.99) (7.72) (2.74) (3.02) 
Ban*Treatment -0.07 0.39 -0.07 -0.24 -0.65 -0.24 
 (-0.02) (0.20) (-0.07) (-0.33) (-0.74) (-0.50) 
Trend-Female  1.49***   0.24***  
  (12.14)   (4.32)  
Trend-Male  1.44***   0.28***  
  (11.74)   (5.11)  
Trend-   1.46***   0.26*** 
(Female & Male)   (17.12)   (6.74) 
Country Dummies + + +     
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-sqr 0.55 0.95 0.95 0.77 0.90 0.90 
2.4.3 Analysis of Micro Data 
Although analyzing aggregate national data before and after the ban allows for identification of 
the impact of the ban, we cannot study the effects on specific population groups with aggregate data. 
Indeed, this ban is expected to impact the outcomes for women who prefer to wear the scarf, and it 
should not impact women who do not wear it. We also undertake an analysis to determine whether the 
ban had any impact for women who prefer to use the headscarf. We only have individual level data 
for headscarf use status after the ban. Table 2-3 provides the summary of the surveys that we use for 
individual level analysis. More information on the micro-data is provided in Appendix A.  
Table 2-3: Summary of the Surveys 
Company Year Type of 
Survey 




Konda 2007 Cross-Section Educational Attainment, Employment  2,639 67 
A&G 2003 Cross-Section Educational Attainment, Employment  927 66.24 
A&G 2007 Cross-Section Educational Attainment, Employment  1,316 57.45 
NFHS 2003 Cross-Section Educational Attainment, Employment, Fertility 8,075 75.4 




The first data that we use is from Konda Research Company’s survey in 2007. The second dataset 
is from A&G research company’s two field surveys conducted in 2003 & 2007. The third dataset is 
National Family and Health Surveys conducted in 2003 and 2008. The descriptive statistics are 
provided in Table C-2, Table C-3 and Table C-4 respectively.  Appendix A provides details of the 
wording of wearing headscarf questions. Descriptive information provided by all the surveys indicates 
that there is a large educational gap between women wearing headscarf and not wearing headscarf. 
To see a clearer picture of the link between headscarf use and educational attainment, potentially 
confounding factors need to be controlled. We start with the Konda 2007 survey. Our control 
variables are age in categories
17
, marital status, household size, household income, current region of 
residence, urban/rural status, and region of birth in the regression model together with headscarf 
dummy variable. The dependent variable is having a university or higher education degree. Marginal 
effects calculated from probit models are presented in Table 2-4.  
Table 2-4: Probit Estimates of Tertiary Degree Holding (Marginal Effects)– Konda 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Headscarf -0.083*** -0.073*** -0.077*** -0.081*** 
 (-7.60) (-6.28) (-6.00) (-5.67) 
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Self-reported Religiosity - + - - 
Religious practices - - + + 
Women should be able to work - - - + 
N 2,498 2,467 2,459 2,247 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 
 
From model (1), women wearing a headscarf are 8.3% less likely to hold a tertiary education 
degree. The results in model (1) might be just because there is less demand for education among 
religious people. In order to control for that, the individual’s own reported degree of religiosity is 
included in model (2). Moreover, individual frequency of praying the daily five prayers, fasting, 
reading the Quran and making voluntary prayer are included in model (3). The coefficient might still 
be attributed to value structure differential. In order to reduce bias in the estimate, one can incorporate 
ideas on women’s paid work. The answers to the question of whether women should work in order to 
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 Age categories in the survey are 18-28 years old, 29-43 years old, 44 or more years old. Because of these 
wide categories, we could not exploit the fact that some age groups are exposed to the ban and some are not in 






 are included in model (4). The figures for models (2), (3) and (4) are also 
very similar. According to model (4), women wearing headscarf are 8.1% less likely to hold a 
university or higher degree. However, it is hard to attribute this solely to headscarf ban. It could also 
be that women who do not want to get higher education are more likely to use a headscarf. That is, 
women who use the headscarf are aware of the consequences of it in terms of their educational 
attainment. So, the choice to wear the scarf is endogenous. Therefore, one cannot interpret the results 
as the effect of the ban. Yet, the results still suggests that even after controlling for engaging in 
religious practices, women wearing headscarves have significantly lower educational attainment.  
A similar analysis is conducted using a combined version of A&G research’s surveys in 2003 and 
2007. For that purpose, having a tertiary education degree or being a tertiary education student is 
regressed on age, marital status, current household income, current region of residence, urbanity, year 
dummy, whether the respondent reads the daily newspaper, age at most 17 in 1997 dummy variable, 
headscarf dummy variable and headscarf dummy variable interacted with age at most 17 in 1997 
dummy variable. The marginal effects calculated from probit models are reported in Table 2-5.  
Age at most 17 in 1997 is used as a cut-off point because these women are exposed to the 
headscarf ban fully. The sample is restricted to women who at most 17 years old in 1990, because 
1990 marks the beginning of the relatively free period for women with headscarves. Moreover, the 
headscarf ban would not really matter for the education decisions of older generations. Model (2) 
differentiates between the potential impacts of the ban on different age-group of women. 18-21 year 
old women in 1997 were more likely to be in higher education institutions. This age-group would 
have been impacted by the ban whereas women older than 21 in 1997 could have graduated already, 
therefore might not be affected by the ban. We call 18-21 year old women a transition group. In 
model (3), we restrict the fully exposed ones to women aged 16 at most in 1997. Since entering 
tertiary education requires a long-preparation period, women aged 17 have possibly already invested 
in tertiary education preparation for a year, and thus could be grouped with women of ages 18-21 in 
1997.  
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 The responses range from, “I agree”, “it depends”, “I do not agree”, “I do not know”. Therefore, 4 dummies 




Table 2-5: Probit Estimates of Tertiary Degree Holding (Marginal Effects) -A&G 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Headscarf -0.129*** -0.208*** -0.211*** -0.106 -0.200 -0.213 
  (-3.52) (-3.44) (-3.58) (-1.15) (-1.36) (-1.51) 
Headscarf*age at most 17 in 1997 -0.027 0.049  -0.132 -0.035  
 (-0.55) (0.70)  (-1.10) (-0.21)  
Headscarf*age 18-21 in 1997  0.132*   0.153  
  (1.70)   (0.84)  
Headscarf*age at most 16 in 1997   0.018   -0.091 
   (0.25)   (-0.54) 
Headscarf*age 17-21 in 1997   0.167**   0.237 
   (2.35)   (1.45) 
Baseline controls + + + + + + 
N 892 892 892 401 401 401 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.15 0.16 0.20 
In model (4), the sample is restricted only to respondents holding a high-school degree, tertiary 
degree or in the process of obtaining the tertiary degree, to check whether the headscarf ban 
influences only the transition from high school to tertiary education or not. Model (5) checks for 
transition to higher education for different age-groups as in model (2). Model (6) checks for transition 
to higher education, but we use the classification of model (3). The interaction term of headscarf with 
age categories is the variable of interest for observing the effect of the headscarf ban.  
In all 6 models, the interaction term is either insignificant or positive. We did not find any 
evidence that the headscarf ban negatively impacted the educational attainment of women wearing 
headscarves. A word of caution is in order here. Firstly, the sample size is small, among them wearing 
headscarves fewer. Secondly, in this dataset, we do not know whether the women have graduated 
before the ban or not. We only have the age of the women. Not all children begin school in the year 
predicted by school entry policies. The parents of a child born before the school entry date may hold 
their child back for a year and the parents of a child born after school entry date may petition for their 
child to start school a year before, which is typically allowed, or they may send their child to private 
school, where school entry policies are less strict. As a result, compulsory age of education is not 
strictly enforced. There could be many same aged people going to different classes. Moreover, some 
schools have preparatory classes, so using age to predict when the respondent might have graduated 




The third dataset used for this research is NFHS-3 combined with NFHS-4. Mother’s and father’s 
education level, region lived, type of place of residence, age, mother tongue, wealth index, household 
assets such as car, motorbike, TV, refrigerator, telephone as a proxy for wealth, survey year, born 
after 1980, headscarf use and interaction of born after 1980 and headscarf are used as baseline 
controls. “Born after 1980” dummy variable corresponds to “age at most 17 in 1997” dummy variable 
in A&G’s survey. Born after 1980 is used as a cut-off point, because women born after 1980 are 
exposed to the headscarf ban fully. Women who are currently younger than 17 years old do not have a 
chance to have higher education, thus they are discarded from analysis. Moreover, educational 
decisions of older generations might not be comparable with younger people. Therefore, women born 
before 1973 are also discarded from analysis. This is the same as restricting the sample only to 
women at most 17 years old in 1990 in A&G’s survey.  
Women born before 1976, if they did not repeat any grade, could get a degree without being 
subject to the headscarf ban, whereas women born between 1979 and 1976 were possibly at school 
when the ban was enacted. In model (2), we differentiate between different possible effects on 
different age groups. Similarly, we include women born in 1980 into the transition group in model (3), 
since they might have already incurred the costs of preparing for university entrance examination.  
In model (4), the sample size is restricted to respondents having a high-school degree versus 
tertiary education degree, to check whether the effect is more on transition to higher education or not. 
Model (5) checks on the effect of the ban on the transition to higher education, while differentiating 
the effects on different age-groups. Similar to model (3), we include women born in 1980 into the 
transition group and also check on the effects of ban on transition to higher education. 
The marginal effects calculated from probit models are shown in Table 2-6. From model (1), 
women wearing a headscarf are 5.3% less likely to have a tertiary education. Model (2) also shows 
similar results. According to model (4), women wearing a headscarf are 12% less likely to have a 
tertiary education compared to having a high school degree. However, the interaction term is 
insignificant in all of the models; therefore, we could not find any evidence for significant change in 




Table 2-6: Probit Estimates of Tertiary Degree Holding (Marginal Effects) - NFHS-2003&2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Headscarf -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.116*** -0.125** -0.125** 
  (-7.05) (-4.64) (-4.63) (-3.64) (-2.49) (-2.50) 
Headscarf*Born after 1980 -0.001 -0.001  0.025 0.033  
  (-0.05) (-0.04)  (0.51) (0.53)  
Headscarf*Born between   -0.000   0.016  
1976&79  (-0.02)   (0.25)  
Headscarf*Born after 1981   0.006   0.049 
   (0.41)   (0.75) 
Headscarf*Born between    -0.005   0.008 
1976&80   (-0.33)   (0.13) 
Baseline Controls + + + + + + 
N 6,593 6,593 6,593 1,428 1,428 1,428 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.13 
 
2.5 The Impact on Labor Force Participation of Women  
In this section, the impact of the ban on female employment is examined firstly in aggregate terms 
using neighboring countries as control group and secondly males as control group. Thirdly, an 
analysis is conducted on women wearing headscarves using micro data.  
2.5.1 Aggregate Country Level Analysis  
In this section, we analyze the impact of the ban for average FLFP and using Turkey as treated 
unit and its neighbors Iran, Syria and Egypt as counterfactuals. The FLFP rate for all countries is 
obtained from World Bank’s database to avoid incomparability
19
.  
Table C-5 provides descriptive statistics for these indicators before and after the headscarf ban 
enactment. The average FLFP rate was higher in Turkey than that of the control group before 1997 
which was for the same period. After 1997 period, Turkey’s FLFP rate fell down whereas the control 
group’s FLFP has increased slightly. We analyze the statistical significance of the information 
provided in Table C-5 using difference-in difference methodology. Table 2-7 provides the estimation 
results.  
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 Since these countries are very different in many aspects, comparability of statistics is of a considerable 
concern. Therefore, we use World Bank’s database which obtained FLFP rate figures from International Labor 
Organization's Key Indicators of the Labor Market database. ILO claims that the indicators are to a large extent 
comparable across countries since they use standardized indicators. Another thing that suggests comparability 
across countries is that ILO indicators rely heavily on the official submission of data by national authorities 




Table 2-7: Fixed Effects Estimates of log Female Labor Force Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ban 0.06 0.02 0.02  
  (1.42) (0.48) (0.58)  
Ban*treatment -0.25*** -0.01 -0.01  
  (-2.85) (-0.06) (-0.25)  
Lagged Ban    0.02 
    (0.57) 
Lagged Ban    0.03 
*Treatment    (0.51) 
Trend-Turkey  -0.02***   
   (-3.16)   
Trend-Syria  -0.02***   
   (-4.12)   
Trend-Iran  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
   (8.22) (8.54) (8.80) 
Trend-Egypt  -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
   (-1.49) (-1.59) (-0.84) 
Trend- Turkey&   -0.02*** -0.02*** 
Syria   (-5.23) (-6.08) 
Country Dummies + + + + 
N 76 76 76 72 
R-sqr 0.10 0.74 0.74 0.77 
Model (1) indicates that FLFP has dropped by 22%
20
 in Turkey compared to the control countries, 
and the effect is statistically significant. In model (2), when country specific time trends are controlled 
for, the effect is no longer statistically significant. Time-trends for Iran and Egypt are markedly 
different from that of Turkey and Syria. However, there is no statistically significant difference 
between time-trends of Turkey and Syria, therefore in model (3), we estimate a common trend for 
Turkey and Syria. Model (4) estimates the lagged effect of the ban. In both model (3) and model (4), 
the effect of the ban is statistically insignificant. 
2.5.2 Analysis of Aggregate National Data  
In this section, we study the impact of the ban on female labor market outcomes using males as a 
control group. The headscarf ban and its implications for the labor market are more of an issue for 
higher educated and in urban areas. Therefore, we firstly focus on urban labor market figures because 
the overall labor market figures are also affected by the rural labor market. Rural labor market is 
mainly driven by the agricultural sector, where it is less likely to observe any effect of the headscarf 






ban because agricultural holdings are not institutionalized, and generally women work as unpaid 
family workers. For having a general feeling of the context, we start with urban LFP and LFP of 
higher educated for each sex depicted in Figure 2-5.   
Figure 2-5: Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender in Turkey 
 
Source: Gender Indicators, TURKSTAT 
Despite the improvement in legislature aimed at removing gender discrimination in employment 
as of 2003, UFLFP has not changed much over the years. Moreover, we do not see a large change 
after 1997 for female LFP compared to males. It can also be seen from Figure 2-5 that the labor force 
participation (LFP) of higher educated women has been declining over the years. The LFP of higher 
educated men also fell slightly. Yet, when compared with the figures for males, no abrupt change is 
visible in LFP of higher educated women.  
Since the headscarf ban directly impedes public sector employment opportunities for a large 
number of women, we shall examine public sector employment of women. Figure 2-6 displays 
statistics regarding female public sector employment. The series is available only from 1995 to 2006 
through TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Surveys. The ratio of female to male employees in the 
public sector was 25% in 1995; this ratio fell down in 1999 and 2001 slightly. Overall, the sex ratio 
did not change much over time. Similarly, the gender ratio in the public sector stayed almost the same 
over time. These two indicators do not show an abrupt change in female employment in the public 












































































































Figure 2-6: Public Sector Employment of Women  
 
Source: Household Labor Force Surveys, TURKSTAT 
 
In Table 2-8, we provide the estimates of the effect of the ban on urban LFP and LFP of higher 
educated females using males as control group.  
Table 2-8: Fixed Effects Estimates of Labor Market Outcomes 
 Urban LFP Rate LFP of Higher Educated 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Ban -0.02** 0.03* -0.06*** -0.03** -0.02 
 (-2.18) (1.97) (-5.73) (-2.13) (-1.41) 
Ban*Treatment 0.04*** -0.03* -0.02 0.01 -0.02* 
 (2.86) (-1.70) (-1.46) (0.29) (-1.92) 
Trend-Female  -0.01***  -0.00**  
  (-4.15)  (-2.49)  
Trend-Male  0.00**  -0.01***  
  (2.04)  (-4.79)  
Trend-     -0.00*** 
(Female & Male)     (-5.02) 
Country Dummies + + + +  
N 38 38 38 38 38 
R-sqr 0.19 0.52 0.55 0.95 0.95 
According to model (1), the headscarf ban resulted in a 4% rise in urban labor force participation 
rate for females compared to males. When gender specific time trends
21
 are added in model (2), we 
observe a 3% drop in urban LFP rate for females and the effect is statistically significant at 10% level. 
Similar models are also run for LFP of higher educated women. Model (1) suggests a 2% drop in LFP 
of higher educated women after the ban compared to higher educated males LFP. But, the effect is not 
statistically significant. When gender specific time trends are introducted in model (2), we also 
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 The gender specific time trends are markedly different from each other, therefore a model with a common 
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observe an insignificant effect of the ban. However, since there is no marked difference between 
females and males time trends, we estimate model (3) with a common trend for males and females. 
According to model (3), the ban resulted in 2% drop in LFP of higher educated women and the effect 
is statistically significant at 10% level.  
2.5.3 Analysis of Micro Data  
Table C-6 provides descriptive information from Konda’s 2007 survey on labor market outcomes 
for women by the use of headscarf. Table C-7 and Table C-8 also provide similar descriptives using 
A&G’s surveys conducted in 2003 & 2007 and NFHS-2003 & NFHS-2008 datasets respectively. 
From all descriptive statistics, there are sharp and statistically significant differences in all job types 
and overall employment status between women wearing headscarves and not wearing the scarves. 
Women wearing headscarves are less likely to be employed. When one looks into the categories of 
employment, women wearing headscarves are less likely to be employed in the public sector and the 
private sector, and are also less likely to be self-employed.  
It is not surprising that there is a difference between women wearing the headscarf and the ones 
that do not in public sector jobs. However, there are also very sharp differences in the private sector as 
well. Cindoglu (2010) argues that the ban has a spill-over effect. Private companies do not prefer to 
hire women with headscarves, because they cannot do their job whenever there is a contact with 
public offices. Those women have to be invisible in offices. Due to the nature of white-collar jobs, a 
journalist, an engineer, or a banker would have to deal with many different institutions, some of which 
impose a ban on the headscarf. Encounters with such institutions may result in poor performances, 
which may make a woman with headscarf a liability for the company. Cindoglu (2010) suggests that 
even if there are no discriminatory motivations or intentions from the company, the existence of the 
headscarf ban creates a hostile environment for professional women who want to wear the scarf. 
According to Konda’s 2007 survey results, there is a wide gap between the LFP rate of women with 
tertiary education by their use of headscarf. Among women with tertiary education, 35% of women 




We also conducted a regression analysis. We first look into Konda’s 2007 survey. Our baseline 
control variables are age, marital status, household size, household income, current region of 
residence, urban/rural status, region of birth together with headscarf dummy in model (1). In model 
(2), we include education status. One can argue that there might be less demand for employment 
among religious women. In order to control for that, individual’s own reported degree of religiosity is 
included in model (3). Instead of religiosity, we included individual frequency of praying, fasting, 
reading the Quran and making voluntary prayer as additional regressors in model (4). We also tried to 
incorporate a value structure by including the responses to questions on women’s work. In Konda 
2007 survey, the respondents are asked whether they agree with the following statement; ‘women 
should work in order to contribute family budget’. The responses to this question are also included in 
the model (5)
22
. Marginal effects calculated from probit models are reported in Table 2-9. Although 
according to model (1), women wearing headscarf are 12.3% less likely to be employed; the effect of 
headscarf goes down in models (2), (3) and (4). Model (5) suggests that women wearing a headscarf 
are 4.1% less likely to be employed after accounting for extensive set of controls.  
Table 2-9: Probit Estimates of Employment Status (Marginal Effects)– Konda 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Headscarf -0.123*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.045** -0.041** 
 (-7.58) (-4.70) (-4.16) (-2.29) (-2.06) 
Baseline Controls + + + + + 
Education Level - + + + + 
Self-reported Religiosity - - + - - 
Religious practices - - - + + 
Women should be able to work - - - - + 
N 2,504 2,496 2,465 2,457 2,455 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Using A&G’s surveys conducted in 2003 and 2007, employment status is regressed on headscarf 
use, age, marital status, current household income, current region of residence, urbanity, survey year, 
whether the respondent reads a newspaper in model (1). Model (1) is the baseline model. In the model 
(2), we also included education status. Prayer frequency was only asked in the 2003 survey. In model 
(3), the baseline regressors plus praying frequency are used in explaining employment status. In 
model (4), education status is added to the model (3). The regression results are summarized in Table 
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 The responses range from, “I agree”, “it depends”, “I do not agree”, “I do not know”. Therefore, 4 dummies 




2-10. According to model (1), women wearing a headscarf are 12.9% less likely to be working, but 
when education and prayer frequency is incorporated in model (4), women wearing a headscarf are 
4.9% less likely to be working.  





The third regression analysis is conducted using NFHS 2003 and NFHS 2008 surveys. In model 
(1), the regressors for explaining employment status are age, mother’s and father’s education level, 
region lived, type of place of residence (urban/rural), mother tongue, wealth index and some 
household assets (car, motorbike, TV, refrigerator, telephone) as a proxy for wealth, survey year. 
Model (1) is our baseline model. In model (2), we included education status. In model (3), prayer and 
fasting habits are added to model (2). Prayer and fasting habits were only asked in the NFHS-2008 
survey, therefore the numbers of observations are much smaller. In model (4) the ideas on whether 
women should work are added to the regressors used for model (3). The regression results are 
provided in Table 2-11.  
Table 2-11: Probit Estimates of Employment Status (Marginal Effects) – NFHS-2003&2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Headscarf -0.104*** -0.071*** -0.032** -0.031** 
 (-11.28) (-7.39) (-2.08) (-1.97) 
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Education - + + + 
Religious Practices - - + + 
Women should be able to work - - - + 
N 13,880 13,880 6,710 6,650 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10 
When more controls are added to the model, the coefficient of headscarf drops down from 10.4% 
to 3.1%. Model (4) being the most comprehensive model tells us that women wearing a headscarf are 
3.1% less likely to be employed. Again, wearing a headscarf being a choice plagues the regression 
results with endogeneity.  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Headscarf -0.129*** -0.084*** -0.078*** -0.049* 
  (-8.05) (-5.07) (-2.92) (-1.84) 
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Education - + - + 
Praying Frequency - - + + 
N 2,095 2,095 857 857 




Finally, the National Family and Health survey conducted in 2008 has full employment history 
data. We used NFHS-2008 to construct employment figures for previous years for women with 
headscarves and without headscarves. The average FLFP rate for the two groups in the years 1990-
2008 are shown in Figure 2-7. The headscarf ban might be more relevant for younger cohorts as we 
discussed for tertiary education. In Figure 2-8, we restricted the sample to only women born after or in 
1973.  
Figure 2-7: Female LFP over Time by Headscarf Use 
  
Source: NFHS-2008 
Figure 2-8: Female LFP over Time by Headscarf Use (younger cohorts) 
  
Source: NFHS-2008 
From Figure 2-7, we can see that both women wearing headscarves and not wearing headscarves' 















































































































wearing the scarf was steeper. Labor force participation of women wearing headscarves leveled off in 
2004 and then started to decline. Similarly, Figure 2-8 shows that among younger cohorts, both 
women with the scarf and without the scarf experienced a rise in labor force participation, although 
the rate of increase was higher for women not wearing a headscarf. Similarly, for younger cohort 
women wearing headscarves, labor force participation started to drop from 2004 onwards. However, 
this difference could be because of the age structure difference between women wearing headscarves 
and not wearing headscarves or place of residence.  
The NFHS-2008 dataset has migration history, marriage history as well as the full fertility history 
for women. After controlling for these observable factors, we check whether there is any change in 
LFP of headscarved women after 1997 period. In model (1), employed dummy variable is regressed 
on age, marital status, current region of residence, urbanity, number of children under 1 years old, 
number of children under 5 years old, number of children under 16 years old, headscarf dummy 
variable, after 1997 dummy variable, interaction of headscarf dummy variable with after 1997 dummy 
variable. This is the baseline model. To capture trending, time trend is included in model (2). In model 
(3), education level is added to the list of regressors. For younger cohorts, we restricted the sample to 
women born in or after 1973. Similar models are run, initially with the baseline regressors. This 
corresponds to model (4) and we added time trend in model (5). In model (6), we also controlled for 
education status for younger cohorts.  
Table 2-12: Probit Estimates of Employment Status (Marginal Effects) – NFHS-2008 
 All women Younger Cohorts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Headscarf  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.002 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 
 (-6.20) (-6.23) (-0.34) (4.19) (4.21) (3.13) 
Headscarf*The ban -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 
  (-8.76) (-8.74) (-8.78) (-8.31) (-8.29) (-8.26) 
Baseline Controls + + + + + + 
Time Trend - + + - + + 
Education - - + - - + 
N 138,933 138,933 138,933 77,747 77,747 77,747 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14 
 
Table 2-12 presents the estimated marginal effects. From model (1), women wearing a headscarf 

























































































Turkey Syria Iran Egypt
women wearing a headscarf are 4.8% less likely to be employed after 1997. These figures imply that 
after the implementation of the ban, women wearing the headscarf became less likely to be employed 
compared to before the ban period. As we expect, the headscarf ban is more of an issue for younger 
cohorts. When we look at model (6), women wearing headscarf are 5.9% less likely to be employed 
after the ban.  
2.6 The Impact on Childbearing  
Since there is a well-documented literature on the link between employment, education and 
childbearing, in this section we examine whether the headscarf ban affects the childbearing rate of 
women. For that purpose, we examine aggregate data of total fertility rate and individual level data 
from NFHS-4 in 2008, since it has full reproduction, employment, marriage, and migration history
23
.  
2.6.1 Analysis of Aggregate Data 
We start our country level analysis by exploring total fertility rate for Iran, Syria, Egypt and 
Turkey. According to Figure 2-9, pre-1997 trends of Turkey are comparable to that of Syria and 
Egypt. Iran seems to have a steeper downward trend before 1997.  











Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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 Although NFHS-3 conducted in 2003 also has fertility history, it does not have history of other control 




Total fertility rate figures for all countries are obtained from the same source (World Bank 
database)
24
 to minimize potential differences in data definition and other data collection differences
25
. 
Table C-9 provides descriptive statistics of the total fertility rate before and after the headscarf ban 
enactment for these countries and reports a 0.71 higher TFR in Turkey compared to control group 
after the enactment of the ban. To check whether an 0.71 increase in TFR is statistically significant or 
not, fixed effects regression analysis is conducted. Table 2-13 provides the estimation results.  
Table 2-13: Fixed Effects Estimates of Total Fertility Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ban -1.27*** -0.32*** -0.34***  
  (-12.41) (-3.70) (-4.27)  
Ban*treatment 0.71*** 0.20 0.27**  
  (3.48) (1.12) (2.50)  
Lagged Ban    -0.26*** 
    (-3.40) 
Lagged Ban*treatment    0.20* 
    (1.97) 
Trend-Turkey  -0.05***   
   (-3.43)   
Trend-Syria  -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
   (-10.43) (-10.70) (-10.34) 
Trend-Iran  -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
   (-14.86) (-15.31) (-14.24) 
Trend-Egypt  -0.05***   
   (-5.64)   
Trend-Turkey&   -0.05*** -0.05*** 
Egypt   (-6.61) (-6.41) 
Country Dummies + + + + 
N 76 76 76 72 
R-sqr 0.70 0.94 0.94 0.93 
According to model (1), the 0.71 higher TFR rate in Turkey is statistically significant. In model 
(2), when country specific time trends are controlled for, the effect is no longer statistically significant. 
In model (3), we estimate the model with a common trend for Turkey and Egypt, since there is no 
statistically marked difference between Turkey’s and Egypt’s trend in model (2). Model (3) indicates 
that the headscarf ban led to 0.27 higher TFR. In model (4), the lagged effect of the ban is estimated. 
Similarly, the ban had increased TFR by 0.2 children per woman.  
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 World Bank Database refers United Nations (UN) Population Division, Census reports and other statistical 
publications from national statistical offices and U.S. Census Bureau: International Database for fertility figures.  
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2.6.2 Analysis of Micro Data  
A natural point to start is to look at total number of children for the two groups. Table C-10 
presents descriptive information on average number of children by headscarf use. Women wearing the 
headscarf have more children on average. Even among younger cohort women born after or in 1973, 
still women wearing headscarf have more children on average.  
We also calculated the number of children born in each year from 1990 to 2008 using NFHS-2008. 
Figure 2-10 depicts the average birth rate for the two groups in the period 1990-2008 whereas Figure 
2-11 shows the same relationship for younger cohorts.  
Figure 2-10: Birth Rate over Time by Headscarf Use 
 
Source: NFHS- 2008 
 
It is apparent from Figure 2-10 that the birth rate of women wearing the headscarf is higher than 
that of women not wearing it. On the other hand, both series are moving together over time. That is, 
there is no discernible change in birth rate of women wearing the headscarf compared to women not 
wearing it. Similar to tertiary education and labor force participation decisions, the headscarf ban 
might be more relevant for younger cohorts’s childbearing. Figure 2-11 shows a drop in birth rate for 
women not using the headscarf, whereas we see a rise in the birth rate for women using the headscarf 
































































Figure 2-11: Birth Rate over Time by Headscarf Use for Younger Cohorts 
   
Source: NFHS- 2008 
The difference in birth rate might be due to various factors. For instance, women not wearing a 
headscarf might be younger and women wearing it might be older. To control for other characteristics 
that might be important for childbearing, we conducted a regression analysis. In model (1), birth rate 
is regressed on employment status, age, marital status, region of residence, urbanity, headscarf 
dummy variable, after 1997 dummy variable, interaction of headscarf dummy variable with after 1997 
dummy variable. This is the baseline model. The time trend is included in model (2) to capture 
trending. For younger cohorts, we restricted the sample only women born in or after 1973. Similar 
models are run, initially with the baseline regressors. This corresponds to model (3) and we add time 
trend in model (4). Table 2-14 presents the marginal effects calculated from the probit models for 
childbearing. 
Table 2-14: Probit Estimates of Child Birth (Marginal Effects) – NFHS 2008 
 All women Younger Cohorts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Headscarf  0.011*** 0.011*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (3.13) (3.12) (-0.01) (-0.06) 
Headscarf*the ban 0.000 -0.001 0.014* 0.014* 
  (0.01) (-0.13) (1.78) (1.77) 
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Time Trend - + - + 
N 138,933 138,933 77,747 77,747 




























































When the first two columns are examined, we did not observe any significant change in child 
birth for women wearing headscarves after 1997. On the contrary, for younger cohorts, women 
wearing headscarves are 1.4% more likely to have a child birth after 1997 according to model (4).  
As we did for tertiary educational attainment, we check whether we observe different short-term 
and long term fertility behavior on different age groups. The dependent variable is number of births in 
the previous five years from the time of the survey. For studying the effects on short-term fertility 
behavior, we use NFHS-2003 dataset and for studying the effects on long-term fertility behavior, we 
use NFHS-2008 dataset.  
For We use “born after 1980” as a cut-off point, because women born after 1980 are exposed to 
the headscarf ban fully whereas women before 1980 might be partially subject to the ban or might not 
be subject to the ban at all. Since, fertility decisions of older generations might not be comparable 
with younger people, women born before 1973 are also discarded from analysis.  
Mother’s and father’s education level, region lived, type of place of residence, age, mother tongue, 
wealth index, household assets such as car, motorbike, TV, refrigerator, telephone as a proxy for 
wealth, survey year, born after 1980, headscarf use and interaction of born after 1980 and headscarf 
are used as baseline controls in model (1). In model (2), we differentiate between different possible 
effects on different age groups. The idea is that women born before 1976, if they did not repeat any 
grade, could get a degree without being subject to the headscarf ban, whereas women born between 
1979 and 1976 were possibly at school when the ban was enacted. Therefore, we include born after 
1980 and born between 1976 and 79 and their interactions with headscarf use in model (2). In model 
(3), we include women born in 1980 into the transition group since they might have already incurred 
the costs of preparing for university entrance examination. The marginal effects calculated from tobit 
models are shown in Table 2-6.  
From model (1), women wearing a headscarf are 19.8% more likely to have birth in the previous 
five years from NFHS-2003. Model (2) and Model (3) also show similar results. However, according 
to the first three models, the interaction term is insignificant; therefore, we could not find any 
statistically significant effect on short-term fertility. On the other hand, according to the last three 




NFHS-2008among women wearing headscarves and born after 1980.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
ban impacted long-term fertility among women wearing headscarves who are fully exposed to the ban.  
Table 2-15: Tobit Estimates of Births in the previous five years (Marginal Effects) - NFHS 
 Short-term effects Long-term effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Headscarf 0.198*** 0.214*** 0.218*** -0.027 -0.010 -0.003 
  (4.35) (3.32) (3.37) (-0.60) (-0.15) (-0.05) 
Headscarf*Born after 1980 0.083 0.072  0.187*** 0.172**  
  (1.05) (0.79)  (3.19) (2.25)  
Headscarf*Born between   -0.028   -0.037  
1976&79  (-0.33)   (-0.44)  
Headscarf*Born after 1981   0.088   0.157** 
   (0.89)   (1.98) 
Headscarf*Born between    -0.019   0.021 
1976&80   (-0.24)   (0.26) 
Baseline Controls + + + + + + 
N 2,867 2,867 2,867 3,757 3,757 3,757 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.040 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.058 0.054 
2.7 Conclusion 
The headscarf ban is a hotly debated issue for Turkey, and also for other countries. Although 
public opinion in Turkey is overall against the ban, the ban has remained since 1997. Other studies 
have established that the majority of females in Turkey wear headscarves. Naturally, one can expect 
to observe effects of the ban in many aspects of life for females, and possibly also for males. In this 
study, we focus on measuring the impact the headscarf ban on female educational attainment, labor 
force participation (LFP) and child bearing decisions.  
We study the impact of the headscarf ban by employing two methodologies. We analyzed 
aggregate country level data using difference in differences (DD) methodology, with Turkey as the 
treated unit and some neighboring countries as the control group. Similarly, aggregate national data is 
analyzed with females as the treated and males as the control group. We also utilized individual level 
data to check potential effects on specific population groups. Ideally, we would need individual level 
data which has information on headscarf use status, educational attainment, employment status and 
childbearing before and after the ban. Unfortunately, we only have individual level data for headscarf 
use status after the ban. We can still provide suggestive evidence, because women who are born after 




fully if they did not repeat any grade. However, we can only observe headscarf use status once, at the 
time of the survey. Our analysis is based on the assumption that women’s religious preferences do not 
change over time.  
The results from country level analysis using difference in differences methodology suggest that 
the headscarf ban led to a 27% drop in the female to male ratio for tertiary education students, but 
when country specific time trends are added, the effect is no longer statistically significant. Similarly, 
although we find 22% drop in female LFP, when country specific time trends are added, the effect is 
no longer statistically significant. However, we find 0.27 increase in total fertility rate from country 
level analysis which includes country specific time trends.  
The results from national aggregate data using males as control group also did not report any 
significant effect on overall female tertiary education indicators. We observe 3% drop urban LFP rate 
of females and 2% drop in LFP of higher educated females after the introduction of the ban compared 
to males. Both estimates are statistically significant at 10% level.  
Although all individual level data indicate a large educational gap between women wearing 
headscarves and women not wearing headscarves, we did not detect a significant difference for 
tertiary educational attainment of women who were fully exposed to the ban (wearing headscarves 
and born after 1980) compared to women who may not be exposed to the ban (wearing headscarves 
and born between 1973 and 79) assuming standard progression through school. We also documented a 
wide gap in employment status of women by their use of the headscarf. Even after controlling for 
religion-related covariates, the use of headscarf is negatively associated with being employed. Using 
employment history from NFHS-2008, we find that after the enactment of the headscarf ban, 
employment probability dropped by 4.8% for women wearing headscarves. This is more pronounced 
for younger cohort women wearing headscarves. We observe a drop of 5.9% for this group after the 
enactment of the ban. Moreover, using full fertility, employment, marriage, and migration history 
from NFHS-2008, we observe an increased childbearing probability for younger cohort women 
wearing headscarves by 1.4% after the enactment of the ban, although the coefficient is significant at 
10% significance level. We support this effect on fertility by looking at childbearing in the previous 




significant effect on short term fertility of women who are fully exposed (wearing headscarves and 
born after 1980). But, we did find statistically significant effect on long-term fertility on women who 
are fully exposed.  
It is plausible not to observe any significant effect on total number of tertiary education students 
due to excess demand for tertiary education. Those women not wearing a headscarf could easily 
replace women wearing scarves. Although the total number of students who get tertiary education 
might stay the same due to excess demand, quality might fall. In a further study, we would like to 
check the national placement examination scores before and after the ban to check whether there is 
any effect on the quality of students entering higher education institutions. It is also possible that we 
could not identify the impact on women wearing headscarves because, as mentioned in Cindoglu 
(2010), even before 1997, entering a university with a headscarf was not problem-free. 
In a nutshell, we did not find any statistically significant effect of the ban on female tertiary 
educational attainment indicators; whereas we did find some effect at the national and individual level 
on female labor force participation indicators and fertility.  Even if one does not care of the 
consequences of the ban for this particular group of women, such a ban could have an unintended 
byproduct of an increased number of people raised by mothers who prefer to use headscarf.  Therefore, 
we suggest policy makers to consider the potential effects of banning headscarves on women’s 











Appendix A: Data Description 
A.1. Aggregate National Tertiary Education Indicators 
National female labor force participation figures are obtained from the TURKSTAT’s webpage under 
Population, Demography, Housing & Gender main tab  Gender, Life And Family  Data  Gender 
Indicators  Labour Force  Labour force by household population. These statistics are gathered from 
“Household Labor Force Surveys”. 
Public sector employment figures are obtained from the TURKSTAT’s webpage under Population, 
Demography, Housing & Gender main tab  Gender, Life and Family  Data  Gender Indicators  
Labour Force  Employment by status of workplace. These statistics are gathered from “Household 
Labor Force Surveys”. 
LFP rate of Higher Educated women, men and their unemployment rate are obtained from the 
TURKSTAT’s webpage, under Employment, Unemployment & Wages tab  Labor Force Statistics 
Data  Statistical Tables  Periodic Results Of Household Labour Force Survey  Turkey  Labour 
Force Status By Educational Level. These statistics are gathered from “Household Labor Force Surveys”.  
Urban female LFP and female urban non-agricultural unemployment rate are also obtained from 
TURKSTAT’s webpage, under Employment, Unemployment & Wages tab  Labor Force Statistics 
Data  Statistical Tables  Periodic Results Of Household Labour Force Survey  Urban  Labour 
Force Status By Non-Institutional Population, Years And Sex. These statistics are also gathered from 
“Household Labor Force Surveys.”  
A.2. Country Comparison Data 
Data on the ratio of females to males in tertiary education students in Syria from 1990 to 1995 and 
that of Turkey from 1990 to 2007 except for 1996 were also taken from the World Bank Dataset from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.TERT.FM.ZS webpage. The figures for Syria from 1998 to 
2007 are from Statistical Institute of Syria’s webpage under Statistical Abstracts. Figures from 1998 to 
2002 are from Statistical Abstract, 2003 and figures from 2003 to 2007 are from Statistical Abstract, 2008. 
The figure for Turkey in 1996 is calculated used Higher Education Statistics Yearbook of Turkey since it 




LFP figures for Iran, Syria, Egypt and Turkey are downloaded from the World Bank’s Dataset from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS webpage. We used World Bank data for Turkey 
to avoid incomparability. 
Ratio of Female LFP to Male LFP figures for Iran, Syria, Egypt and Turkey are downloaded from the 
World Bank’s Dataset from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FM.ZS webpage. We used 
World Bank data for Turkey to avoid incomparability. 
Total fertility rate (births per women) for Iran, Syria, Egypt and Turkey are downloaded from the 
World Bank’s Dataset from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN webpage. 
A.3. Micro Data 
Firstly, we use data from “Religion, Secularism and Headscarf in Daily Life Survey” (Gündelik 
Yaşamda Din, Laiklik ve Türban Araştırması) to get information on educational attainment and labor 
market outcomes of women wearing a headscarf. Religion, Secularism and Headscarf in Daily Life Survey 
(RSHDLS) is a cross-section survey conducted in September, 2007 by Konda Research Company. Konda 
Research Company is a public opinion poll company which specializes in collecting and analyzing data for 
both political and sociological quests. This survey provides data on various indicators of religious practices, 
perceptions on secularism and the use of headscarves. Data is collected through face to face interviews in 
all regions of Turkey. Individuals eighteen and older are surveyed, and the sample is representative of 
Turkey’s non-institutionalized adult population. The sample size is 5,291. We restricted our sample to 
2,639 females to study the effect on women. The wording of the headscarf question is as follows: “Do you 
wear headscarves while going out? If so, how?” Possible answer categories are; Do not wear headscarves, 
Headscarves (basortusu) and a more traditional headcover (Yemeni), A way of calling headscarves which 
become popular in last decade (Turban), Full-face veil (carsaf veya pece). 67% of women reported wearing 
some sort of headscarf. 75% of women who wear some sort of headcover describe it as a headscarf. For 
our study, we describe women as wearing headscarves if they report wearing one of three types.  
Secondly, we use two different surveys conducted by A&G Research Company. A&G Research 
Company specializes in providing services to political parties, and is well known for its success in 
predicting election outcomes. The first survey was conducted in 2003 for a well-known Turkish newspaper 
called “Milliyet,” with 1,881 respondents; the second one was conducted in 2007 for a famous TV channel 




preferences, opinion of the public on the headscarf and to measure how the use of headscarf and other 
religious practices are changing in society. Data is collected by face to face interviews in all regions of 
Turkey. Individuals eighteen and older are surveyed and the samples are representative of Turkey’s 
electorate adult population. For the purpose of this study, we pooled both datasets together, which provide 
us with 4,501 observations. We discard males, thus, our analysis is based on 2,245 females. The wording 
of the headscarf question is the same for the two surveys, which is as follows: “Is there anyone at this 
household who covers her head when she goes out for shopping, city center, walking etc. If so, who? The 
answers are categorized as: Yes, I do, Yes, my daughter, Yes, my mother, Yes, my grandmother, Yes, 
others. No. For our study, we describe women as wearing headscarves if they answer as “Yes, I do”. 66.24% 
of women reported wearing a headscarf in the 2003 survey, whereas this percentage has dropped to 57.45% 
in 2007.  
Lastly, we use two rounds of National Family and Health Survey (NFHS). The NFHS is mainly 
designed to assess women’s and their kids' health and nutrition status, fertility history, health related 
knowledge, and women’s status in society. It is administered to married women between the ages of 15 to 
49. In the last two waves, some religious behavior is also covered in the survey. For the purpose of this 
study, we pooled together the NFHS-3 conducted in 2003 and the latest NFHS-4 conducted in 2008. The 
data sets report information on the age, sex, health, education and employment status of the individual, as 
well as information on religious behavior such as the use of a headscarf, frequency of five-daily prayers, 
and fasting. NFHS-3 has a sample size of 8,075 women and NFHS-4 has a sample size of 7,405 women. 
Thus, we have in total 15,480 women in our sample. The wording of the headscarf question is the as 
follows: “Do you wear a head scarf when you go outside the street?" The answers are categorized as; Yes 
and No in 2003. In 2008, for the same question, the answers are categorized as; Yes, regularly, yes, 









Appendix B:  
Table B-1: Religiosity Changes over Time among Women 
 
1990 1996 2001 2007 Average 
A religious person 79.8 78.46 82.33 85 81.68 
Not a religious person 19.6 21.26 16.95 14.7 17.78 
A convinced atheist 0.59 0.28 0.72 0.3 0.54 
Total Number of Respondents 505 715 1,658 660 3,538 
 
Table B-2: Probit Estimates of Headscarf Status (Marginal Effects) - NFHS-2003&2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Born after 1980 0.035* 0.024   
  (1.79) (0.73)   
Born between 1976&79  -0.008   
  (-0.43)   
Headscarf*Born after 1981   0.023 0.006 
   (1.21) (0.18) 
Born between 1976&80    -0.010 
    (-0.54) 
Baseline Controls + + + + 
N 6,118 6,118 6,118 6,118 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 
Baseline controls: survey year, age, wealth index, mother’s education level, father’s education level, 
ownership of car, motorbike, TV, refrigerator and telephone as a proxy for wealth, region lived, type of 














Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
Table C-1: Descriptive Statistics for Ratio of Females to Males in Tertiary Education Students 
  Before 1997 After 1997 Difference DD 
Turkey  57.83 71.84 15.21 -23.06 
Iran 43.51 99.7 56.17 
 
Syria 68.1 86.56 18.49 
 
Table C-2: Women's education level by use of headscarf (N=2,609 women in total) 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
Illiterate 2.09 17.39 0.00 
literate without a diploma 0.58 7.61 0.00 
primary school graduate 25.09 50.8 0.00 
middle school graduate 12.31 10.93 0.30 
high school graduate 42.28 12.13 0.00 
university or higher degree 17.65 1.14 0.00 
Source: Konda Dataset, 2007 
Table C-3: Women's education level by use of headscarf (N=2,241 women in total) 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
no education 2.87 18.39 0.00 
literate without a diploma 1.61 6.06 0.00 
primary school graduate 21.47 52.85 0.00 
middle school graduate 9.87 10.73 0.52 
high school graduate 44.32 10.15 0.00 
university or higher degree 19.86 1.82 0.00 
Source: A&G Research Company 2003& 2007 combined 
Table C-4: Women's education level by use of headscarf (N=15,456 women in total) 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
no education 2.97 23.78 0.00 
incomplete primary education 2.25 6.84 0.00 
primary school graduate 31.41 53.2 0.00 
incomplete secondary education 17.19 7.94 0.00 
secondary school graduate 26.46 6.24 0.00 
University or higher education 19.73 2 0.00 





Table C-5: Descriptive Statistics: Female Labor Force Participation 
  Before 1997 After 1997 Difference DD 
Turkey  31.76 26.43 -5.32 -5.6 
Iran 10.13 15.59 5.46  
Syria 20.76 18.34 -2.42  
Egypt 22.59 23.41 -2.23   
Table C-6: Women’s Labor Market Status by headscarf - Konda 2007 (N=2,616) 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
Employed 30.32 10.22 0.00 
Public Sector 7.06 0.57 0.00 
Private Paid Employment 13.66 5.14 0.00 
Self-Employment and Other Jobs 9.61 4.51 0.00 
Not Employed 69.68 89.78 0.00 
Unemployed 5.90 1.48 0.00 
Student 11.23 1.66 0.00 
Not in Labor Force 52.55 86.64 0.00 
 
Table C-7: Women’s Labor Market Status by headscarf A&G 2003& 2007 (N=2,233) 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
Employed 31.39 5.81 0.00 
Public Sector 8.93 0.88 0.00 
Private Paid Employment 12.49 2.72 0.00 
Self-Employment 9.97 2.21 0.00 
Not Employed 68.61 94.19 0.00 
Unemployed 2.41 0.37 0.00 
Not in the Labor Force 50.63 92.87 0.00 
Student 15.58 0.96 0.00 
 
Table C-8: Women’s Labor Market Status by headscarf NFHS- 2003&2008 (N=15,455) 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
Employed 33.99 25.39 0.00 






Table C-9: Descriptive Statistics - Total Fertility Rate 
 Before 1997 After 1997 Difference DD 
Turkey  2.86 2.3 -0.56 0.71 
Iran 3.84 2.07 -1.78  
Syria 4.73 3.46 -1.27  
Egypt 3.92 3.16 -0.76   
Table C-10: Average number of children by use of headscarf NFHS - 2008 
  without headscarf with headscarf P-value 
All women (N= 7,390) 1.7 2.96 0.00 
Younger cohorts (N= 4,122) 1.36 2.23 0.00 
 
Appendix D: Summary Table 
Table D-  Summary of Regression Results 
Micro Data 
    Konda A&G NFHS 
Tertiary Degree Holding 
Headscarf -0.081*** -0.143*** -0.053*** 
Headscarf*age at most 17 in 19997   -0.005   
Headscarf*born after 1980     -0.001 
Employment 
Headscarf -0.041** -0.049* -0.031** 
Headscarf*the ban     -0.048*** 
Childbearing for younger cohort Headscarf*the ban     0.014* 
Aggregate Data 
Log of F/M ratio in Tertiary Stud. -0.04 
  
  
Log of LFP -0.01 
  
  










3 Does presumed consent save lives? Evidence from Europe 
3.1 Introduction  
The number of organ transplants has constantly increased in each year in Europe; but has not kept 
pace with demand. The long waiting lists for transplantation became a common phenomenon. Among 
others, one policy option is playing with legislative defaults for fostering cadaveric donation.  
In Europe, there are two types of institutional arrangements for getting consent for organ 
transplantation. One is informed consent or opt-in and the other is presumed consent or opt-out.  In 
informed consent regime, individuals are expected to declare explicitly their willingness by 
registering to be an organ donor. Therefore, individuals who are not registered in the system are 
assumed to not donate their organs in the case of death. In presumed consent regime, a brain-dead 
individual whose organs are suitable for transplantation is automatically considered to be a donor 
unless she has stated a preference for not donating.  In practice, in some presumed and informed 
consent countries, consent from the family of the deceased is routinely sought even if he or she 
explicitly stated her preference to be a donor.  
Figure 3-1 shows cadaveric donor rate in 2010 for EU-27 countries, Croatia and Turkey by the 
type of consent regime. It is apparent from Figure 3-1 that cadaveric donor rate is higher in presumed 
consent countries. Is this by chance? 
Figure 3-1: Cadaveric Organ Donor Rate per million population in 2010 
 




























































































































































Theoretically speaking, if the costs associated with registering preferences for organ donation are 
low
26
, the defaults would not have a great effect for fully rational individuals who already have 
established preferences for organ donation. This is because in the case of mismatch of the default and 
the preferences, individuals are expected to take an action for the desired option.  On the other hand, if 
individuals are more likely to accept the effortless default option rather than make a choice which has 
mental costs, particularly for organ donation since it requires thinking about death which is generally 
perceived as unpleasant and stressful, then defaults might matter.  
Even if presumed consent is not strictly enforced, that is, family consent is always sought; 
legislating presumed consent might still be a positive signal from the government to the families. Both 
informed and presumed consent legislation carry a message about a social norm on the default course 
of action. The signal in presumed consent is that the government expects the family to give consent; 
whereas in informed consent legislation, donating is framed as something extraordinary, up to the 
wishes of the family.  
Presumed consent legislation might even impact the way doctors talk to families. Doctors have 
the law on their side when trying to explain the need for organ donation to a bereaved family, whereas 
in informed consent countries doctors’ task of convincing a bereaved family is much more difficult 
and there is not much to say in case a family decides not to donate organs.   
The underlying motivation for studying legislative defaults is not increasing organ donors per se, 
what matters from a policy perspective is the number of “lives saved”. It is not clear whether 
increased cadaveric donation effectively translates into number of transplantations. Moreover, even if 
informed consent countries succeed in producing the same number of cadaveric donor rate pmp (per 
million population), there might still be differences in terms of age structure of the donor pool. A 
person’s organs could only be used if she/he dies through unexpected causes of death such as 
homicide, transport accidents and cerebro-vascular diseases. Especially young people who have a 
riskier life-style are more likely to end up dying through those causes. However, these people are also 
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 There are possibly differences in registration costs among countries; some countries allow for registering the 
preferences for organ donation through online forms, some others have special telephone lines. Some only 
accept applications through mails. Some only accept registration at some special locations which might require 




the ones who are less likely to think of death and register as organ donors since they may foresee a 
long life-time. Presumed consent could solve the registration problem of young and risk-taking people. 
On the other hand, elderly are more likely to think of death and their preferences for organ donation 
might be better known by their close relatives. However, their organs are less useful compared to 
those people who die at younger ages.  Therefore, we expected to observe higher kidney transplantation 
rates in presumed consent countries since presumed consent is supposed to solve procrastination behavior 
of young people who are least likely to think of death and whose organs are the most valuable. 
Figure 3-2: Kidney Transplantation from Deceased Donors Rate per Million Population in 2010 
 
Source: IRODaT 
Figure 3-2 shows kidney transplantations from deceased donors in 2010 for the same set of 
countries by their legislative setting. We also observe higher kidney transplantation rate in presumed 
consent countries compared to informed consent countries.  
This study aims at examining the impact of presumed consent on cadaveric donations and kidney 
transplantations using a panel dataset from the EU-27 countries plus Croatia in the period 2000-2010. 
For identifying the impact of presumed consent, we would ideally need country fixed effects models 
which would treat unobserved country level heterogeneity. However, there are a few changes in 
legislation over the last 20 years in Europe. Therefore, we cannot estimate country fixed effects 
reliably and bound to use pooled OLS estimates. Yet, pooled OLS analysis would be biased if 






















































































































































Therefore, in this study we consider the relationship between presumed consent and several organ 
donation indicators. These indicators are willingness to donate one’s own organs, willingness to give 
consent for a family member, organ donation card holding, actual cadaveric donation rates, and 
kidney transplantation rates. To ensure reliability of pooled OLS estimates, we follow a three step 
approach.  
We firstly study differences in willingness to donate one’s organs in presumed and informed 
consent countries. If we do not find any statistically significant difference in willingness to donate 
one’s organs in presumed and informed consent countries, there will be less concern for biased 
estimates from pooled OLS analysis. Secondly, we study differences in registering preferences for 
organ donation in presumed and informed consent countries by looking at organ donation card 
holding behavior. For presumed consent to have an impact on organ donation rates, we should 
observe differences in registering behavior. If people do register their preferences for organ donation 
in case of a mismatch between their preferences for organ donation and legislative default, then it is 
unlikely to observe any behavioral effects of presumed consent. The third step which forms our main 
analysis explores the impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric donations and kidney 
transplantations.  
In the first step, we check endogeneity of presumed consent by asking the following question “Do 
individuals in presumed consent countries exhibit higher willingness to donate their own organs and 
higher willingness to give consent for a family member?” For answering this question, individual 
level data from the 2002, 2006, 2009 Eurobarometer Surveys are used. Even after controlling for 
socio-economic background indicators, we do not detect any statistically significant relationship 
between willingness to donate and presumed consent legislation. These findings imply that presumed 
consent legislation is not necessarily enacted in countries where there is wide social acceptance of 
organ donation. This is somewhat reassuring for Pooled OLS results.  
In the second step, we try to answer the following question “Do individuals take action in line 
with their preferences when there is a mismatch of the legislative default and the desired option?” To 
check on this idea, we use organ donation card holding from Eurobarometer, 2006 survey since 




expectations, we find significantly lower donation card holding among those who are willing to 
donate their organs in presumed consent countries. Surprisingly, among people who are not willing to 
donate, we do not observe higher registration in presumed consent countries. These findings suggests 
that presumed consent can increase cadaveric donation rates because people who are not willing to 
donate their organs fail to register their preferences in presumed consent countries.  
In our main analysis, we try to answer the following questions: Does presumed consent impact 
cadaveric organ donations? Does presumed consent increase kidney transplantations? Using 
international organ donation registry data, we find that presumed consent countries have 28 to 32% 
higher cadaveric donation and 27 to 31% higher kidney transplant rates in comparison to informed 
consent countries after accounting for potential confounding factors.  
Evidence from other studies such as Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2004) 
and Johnson, et al. (1993) show that cleverly set defaults affect the pension savings and insurance 
choices. In the context of organ donation, a handful of papers has analyzed whether legislative 
defaults such as presumed consent would result in more deceased organ donation rates (Johnson and 
Goldstein 2003; Abadie and Gay 2005; Healy 2005; Bilgel 2010)  
Although previous studies found higher cadaveric organ donation rates in the presumed consent 
countries compared to informed consent countries, there is no consensus about the underlying 
mechanism. Some researchers (the first group) attribute higher cadaveric organ donation rates to the 
effect of presumed consent legislation, whereas others (the second group) see the presumed consent 
legislation as an indicator of a country’s commitment to organ donation. Mainly, the first group of 
studies is criticized on the ground that they did not address unobserved heterogeneity adequately.  
This unobserved heterogeneity could be dealt with a country fixed effects model. However, there is 
either very little change in the legislation over time. Therefore, fixed effects models could not be run. 
Pooled OLS analysis would be biased if presumed consent is enacted in countries where there is 
higher social acceptance of organ donation because, the coefficient of presumed consent might 
capture the effect of social acceptance of organ donation.  
This study contributes to the literature in some important ways. We firstly address potential 




legislated in countries where there is higher social acceptance of organ donation.  To address 
unobserved heterogeneity even better, we group countries according to their geographic, ethnic, 
cultural, and organ donation related cooperation. We then identify the impact of presumed consent 
running country group fixed effects models. The results still show higher cadaveric donation rates in 
presumed consent counties which suggest that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity ultimately 
appears to have little effect.  
Secondly, we address the claim that presumed consent is an indicator of a country’s commitment 
to organ donation rather than a causal mechanism in itself. We show that after taking into account a 
country’s commitment to organ donation proxied by kidney transplant centers as an additional control 
variable, the coefficient of presumed consent is still statistically significant and it even increases. 
Thirdly, although according to Eurobarometer, 2009 survey on organ donation, religious reasons, 
distrust in the system and scare of manipulation of the human body are three major causes of refusal 
for organ donation, previous studies have not dealt with trust in the system and religion differences 
adequately. Abadie and Gay (2005) include religion with a Catholic country indicator which is based 
on majority of population being Catholic or not. To capture trust in the system, we included 
corruption perceptions scores from Transparency International. To control for religiosity changes over 
time, we compiled percentage of population being Roman Catholic and having no religion mainly 
from International Social Survey Program (ISSP), European Social Survey (ESS), European Values 
Survey (EVS) and Eurobarometers conducted between 1999/2000 and 2010. Lastly, to the author’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the impact of presumed consent on kidney transplantation 
which is more relevant from a policy perspective.   
3.2 Organ Shortage Problem and Potential Solutions 
In this section, we show the extent of the organ shortage problem and discuss proposals suggested 
to minimize it. Table 3-1 shows some transplantation (TX) indicators for EU-27+ Croatia. In 2008, 
34,003 patients are added to the waiting list and only 9,042 cadaveric organ donations were available 
for transplantation for EU-27 countries plus Croatia. The rest of the transplantations were conducted 




aforementioned transplant procedures and this figure has increased to 64,663 patients in year 2009. 
The problem is not only the waiting time but also 3,772 patients died while waiting for transplants in 
2008 and 3,809 people lost their lives while waiting for an organ in 2009 for the same set of countries.   
Table 3-1: Transplantation Indicators in EU-27+Crotia 
  2009 2008 
Total Number of Kidney Transplants 18,056 17,356 
# of Patients awaiting for a TX by 31st Dec 64,663 63,490 
# of Patients died while on the Waiting list 3,809 3,772 
# of Cadaveric Organ Donors
27
 9,230 9,042 
Source: Newsletter Transplant (2010; 2009)  
To alleviate organ shortage, increasing live and/or cadaveric donation are possible solutions. One 
the one hand, living donation seems promising since living donation provides a better outcome of 
patient survival when compared with deceased-donor transplantation (Davis & Delmonico, 2005).  
However, live donation is possible only for certain organs such as kidneys, part of liver and lung. 
Heart could only be obtained from cadaveric donors. Moreover, Ellison et al. (2002) identified 56 live 
kidney donors in the US who were subsequently listed for a kidney transplant themselves. 
Furthermore, cadaveric organ donation still provides the majority of organs. Therefore, in this study, 
we chose to focus on cadaveric organ donors.  
Cadaveric donor rate may be influenced by educational efforts of governments, public awareness 
campaigns of the bodies responsible for organ donation, religious setting and transplant infrastructure 
together with the type of consent regime prevailing in the countries. However, educational efforts and 
public awareness campaigns do not always translate into an increased number of donors. For example, 
in the Netherlands, in 1998, the government organized sending 12 million letters in a country of 16 
million asking citizens to register, which failed to impact the effective consent rate (Oz et al, 2003). 
The ineffectiveness of the campaign also casts doubt on the role of education since the Netherlands is 
a country with a highly educated population.  
Having observed demand for organs exceeding supply of organs, some economists emphasized 
the use of monetary incentives for increasing the supply of organs from both cadaveric donors as well 
as live donors (Cohen 1989; Becker and Elías 2007; Howard 2007). However, the use of financial 
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incentives is a controversial suggestion since transactions on human body are often considered to be 
repugnant (Roth 2007). Oz et al. (2003) reports that 66% of international transplant medical 
professionals oppose to direct compensation methods such as tax credits or life insurance benefits for 
donors.  
According to international transplantation medical professionals, the most effective option for 
alleviating organ shortage is enactment of presumed consent. (Oz, et al., 2003) The other potential 
channels such as increasing awareness through campaigns and education do provide nudges. However, 
these nudges do not move the masses. Moreover, these nudges require investment which has a very 
low probability of return because the likelihood of dying under conditions which would be suitable 
organs to be transplanted is very low. Howard and Byrne (2007) estimate the probability of a potential 
donor being an actual donor at some point in her lifetime is 0.0028. Therefore, investing sizeable 
amounts of money for convincing people for organ donation might produce a very negligible effect on 
organ donation. So, we choose to study the potential of the presumed consent legislation for 
producing more organ donors.  
There are two strands of literature which analyzes the impact of presumed consent on organ 
donation. The first strand studies organ donation rates before and after the enactment of presumed 
consent legislation. The second strand compares organ donation rates in presumed consent countries 
with respect to informed consent countries.  
From the first strand, all studies report higher organ donation rates after the enactment of the 
presumed consent legislation in Austria and Belgium. After the introduction of presumed consent in 
Austria in 1982, the donor rate has quadrupled. (Gnant et al, 1991)  Similarly, Roels et al. (1991) 
report more than doubling of kidney donation in Belgium after the introduction of presumed consent 
in 1986. I cannot utilize the legislation change in Austria and Belgium since these changes occurred 
before international country-level organ donation data is available
28
.  
The second strand also reports higher donation rates when presumed consent countries are 
compared with informed consent countries. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) studied 10 European 
countries national registries for organ donation and find evidence higher effective consent rate in 
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presumed consent countries. They also find the relevance of presumed consent using online 
experiment. Abadie and Gay (2005) studies 22 Western developed countries and find higher organ 
donation rates in presumed consent countries for 1993-2002 period. However, since only Sweden 
changed its legislation from informed consent to presumed consent in 1996, that studies relied on 
pooled cross-section analysis in which they did not take into account country fixed effects. For 
instance, if presumed consent is enacted in countries where there is higher social acceptance of organ 
donation, the found effect might be biased. Healy (2005) studied 17 OECD countries higher cadaveric 
donation rates and finds higher donation rates in presumed consent countries. However, Healy (2005) 
attributes higher donation rates in presumed consent countries to commitment of these countries for 
organ donation rather than a causal effect of the presumed consent legislation. Bilgel (2010) also 
studied organ donation for 1993-2006 period for larger number of countries. However, that study used 
Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition methodology which is not econometrically valid. (Greene, 2010)  
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
In this study, our aim is to examine the impact of presumed consent on cadaveric donations and 
kidney transplantations.  However, there are a few changes in legislation over the last 20 years in 
Europe. Given that we cannot estimate country fixed effects, our pooled OLS analysis would be 
biased if presumed consent is legislated in countries where there is higher social acceptance of organ 
donation. Therefore, we follow a three step approach. 
In the first step, we study differences in willingness to donate one’s organs between presumed and 
informed consent countries. If we do not find any statistically significant difference in willingness to 
donate one’s organs in presumed and informed consent countries, there will be less concern for 
pooled OLS analysis. In the second step, we study differences in registering one’s preferences for 
organ donation between presumed and informed consent countries. For presumed consent to have an 
impact on organ donation rates, we should observe differences in registering behavior. If people do 
register their preferences for organ donation in case of a mismatch between their preferences for organ 




consent. The third step which forms our main analysis explores the impact of presumed consent 
legislation on the cadaveric donations and kidney transplantations.  
For the purposes of this study, we use EU countries and some other countries for which 
Eurobarometer survey is conducted either in 2002, 2006 or in 2009. These countries/regions are 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus Republic, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Macedonia, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Turkish Cypriot 
Community, and United Kingdom. Macedonia, Turkish Cypriot Community are eliminated because 
organ donation figures are not available for them. Malta is discarded because type of legislation could 
not be found for this country. Turkey is discarded because causes of deaths which constitute the bulk 
of cadaveric donors were not available.  
3.3.1 The Association between Willingness to Donate and Presumed Consent 
The motivation for undertaking this analysis is that the effect of presumed consent in our main 
analysis could be biased if presumed consent proxies willingness to donate. If there is no statistically 
significant difference in willingness to donate one’s own organs and give consent for a family 
member in presumed and informed consent countries, there will be less concern for pooled OLS 
analysis. Therefore, in this section, we analyze whether willingness to donate, willingness to give 
consent for a family member is higher in presumed consent countries using individual level data from 
2002, 2006, 2009 Eurobarometer Surveys. Willingness to donate own organs variable is derived from 
the following question: “Would you be willing to donate one of your organs to an organ donation 
service immediately after your death?” Willingness to donate organs of a family member is derived 
from “If you were asked in a hospital to donate an organ from a deceased close family member, would 
you agree?” question.  
Eurobarometer surveys are conducted with face to face interview method. Potentially, responses 
to these questions might not fully reflect the true preference for organ donation since the respondents’ 




study as long as people from informed and presumed consent countries do not differ in their tendency 
to engage in socially desirable responding.  
Table 3-2: Attitudes to Organ Donation by Consent Regime 
 % Willing to Donate (own) % Willing to Donate (Family Member) 
 Presumed Informed Presumed  Informed 
Yes 55.83 55.56 52.18 50.81 
No 26.99 25.45 25.08 23.18 
Do not Know 17.18 19.00 22.73 26.01 
N 48,608 22,494 48,608 22,494 
 
Table 3-2 provides descriptive information on the willingness to donate indicators. There are not 
significant differences in terms of percentage of individuals who are willing to donate their own 
organs between presumed and informed consent countries. However, individuals who are willing to 
give consent for a family member are significantly more prevalent in presumed consent countries 
compared to informed consent countries. For both indicators, a large percentage of people did not 
make up their mind yet and replied as “do not know” which implies the preferences for organ 
donation are not clear cut. Therefore, presumed consent legislation could produce more organ 
donation especially through people who do not have a preference.  
Using these surveys, we estimate OLS regression of willingness to donate one’s own organs and 
willingness to give consent for a deceased relative on an indicator variable of presumed consent in 
model (1). We add to these regressions a set of control variables in model (2). The control variables 
are gender, age, residence in an urban or small town (vs. the omitted category of large town), country 
marital status, occupation, age of the respondent at which her full-time education has ended (as an 
indicator for education), fixed telephone line and mobile telephone ownership as a proxy for wealth
29
. 
We also experiment with different samples. Initial regression analysis is conducted for the whole 
sample. We excluded Spain from the sample to see whether anything changes since Spain is well-
known for its success in organ donation (Matesanz and Miranda 2002; Chang et al. 2003). The 
regression models are estimated with standard errors clustered at country level. We also estimated 
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 We used fixed telephone line and mobile phone ownership as a proxy for wealth since this information was 
available in all three Eurobarometer surveys. Eurobarometer 2002 survey has household income variable for 
each country whereas Eurobarometer 2006 and 2009 surveys has asked ownership of a set of household 
durables such as television, DVD player, music CD player, computer, internet access, car etc. Collecting 
information on ownership of household durables became popular with DHS (Demographic Health Surveys) use 
of these as a proxy for wealth. Moreover, Filmer & Pritchett (2001) argue that ownership information can be 




these models with ordered probit models. The results are very similar. For the ease of interpreting the 
regression coefficients, Pooled OLS results are displayed in Table 3-3.  
Table 3-3: Pooled OLS Willingness to Donate Regression Results 
 Willingness to donate 
 (own) 
Willingness to donate 
 (Family Member) 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 









Baseline Controls - + - + 
N 71,102 70,085 71,102 70,085 









Baseline Controls - + - + 
N 68,073 67,085 68,073 67,085 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Interestingly, we find negative coefficients for the relationship between willingness to donate 
one’s own organs, willingness to give consent for a deceased family member and presumed consent 
legislation for the whole sample. After the control variables are accounted for, the coefficient 
becomes positive yet insignificant. We did not find any statistically significant relationship in any of 
these models. These findings imply that presumed consent legislation is not necessarily enacted in 
countries where there is wide social acceptance of organ donation.  
3.3.2 The Association between Registering Preferences and Presumed Consent 
In this section, we analyze whether individuals take action in line with their preferences for organ 
donation when there is a mismatch of the legislative default and their preferences. If people do 
register their preferences for organ donation in case of a mismatch, then it is unlikely to observe any 
behavioral effects of presumed consent. To check on this idea, we use organ donation card holding 
from Eurobarometer, 2006 survey since having the card requires registering to the organ donation 
authority in a country. Donation card holding variable is derived from the following question: “Do 
you already have an organ donation card?”  
In general, we expect individuals who are willing to donate their organs to register their 
willingness in informed consent countries with the donation card and individuals who do not want to 




However, we see individuals from presumed consent countries register their willingness with the 
donation card since most of the presumed consent countries ask for family consent and family refusal 
is minimized when the deceased already has the donation card. (Siminoff et al,  2001) 
We also observe individuals from informed consent countries to register their non-willingness 
with the donation card. Letting individuals to register their non-willingness might be instrumental for 
avoiding family refusal in informed consent countries. If a person did not register to non-willing list, 
family members might be more likely to give consent since this signals that the person is not strongly 
against organ donation.  
Table 3-4 provides descriptive information on the donation card holding. Almost 6% of 
individuals in presumed consent countries have the donation card, whereas 19% of individuals in 
informed consent countries have the donation card. Among individuals who are willing to donate their 
organs, 32% of them registered their preferences with the donation card in informed consent countries, 
whereas almost 10% of individuals who are willing to donate their organs also have registered their 
willingness in presumed consent countries. Among individuals who are not willing to donate their 
organs, roughly 2% and 3% of them registered their preferences in presumed and informed consent 
countries respectively. In line with intuition, among individuals who are willing to donate, registering 
preferences with organ donation card is less common in presumed consent countries. But, surprisingly, 
we observe higher registration in informed consent when individuals are not willing to donate.  
Table 3-4: Percentage of Organ Donation Card Holding by Consent Regime and Preferences for 
Organ Donation 
 Total Sample Willing to 
Donate 
Not Willing to 
Donate 
Presumed 5.97 9.72 1.56 
Informed 18.93 32.11 3.1 
N 27,584 15,053 7,793 
 
We firstly regress having the donation card on presumed consent dummy variable in model (1) for 
the whole sample. We add to this regression a set of control variables in model (2). The control 
variables are gender, age, residence in an urban or small town (vs. the omitted category of large town), 
country marital status, occupation, age of the respondent at which her full-time education has ended 




wealth. The same models are also run for subsample of individuals who are willing to donate or not 
willing to donate.  
We also experiment with different samples. For instance, we excluded Spain from the sample to 
see whether anything changes. All regression models are estimated with standard errors clustered at 
country level. For the ease of interpreting the coefficients, marginal effects calculated from the probit 
estimation results are displayed in Table 3-5. 
Table 3-5: Organ Donation Card Holding Regression Results 
 Total Sample Willing to Donate Not Willing to Donate 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 

















Baseline Controls - + - + - + 
N 27,584 27,167 15,053 14,880 7,793 7,643 

















Baseline Controls - + - + - + 
N 26,558 26,167 14,487 14,333 7,610 7,464 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
We observe significantly lower organ donation card holding in presumed consent countries on 
average. In line with our expectations, we find lower donation card holding among individuals who 
are willing to donate their organs in presumed consent countries. The negative coefficients stay 
statistically significant even after the control variables are accounted for. However, surprisingly 
among people who are not willing to donate, we do not observe higher registration in presumed 
consent countries. These findings imply that presumed consent legislation is likely to increase 
cadaveric donation rates because not willing individuals fail to register their preferences in presumed 
consent countries. This could be due to many reasons. For instance, informed consent countries might 
be more active in soliciting for organ donation through advertising donation card more eagerly. 
Another channel could be different registration costs in different countries. For instance, in the 
Netherlands
30
 and in the UK
31
 which are both informed consent countries, online registration of the 
                                                   
30
From the following webpage: https://www.donorregister.nl/uwregistratie/campagne/ 
31




preference for organ donation is possible. On the other hand, Sweden
32
 which is a presumed consent 
country also allows for online registration of the preference. But, difference in the costs of registering 
the preferences for organ donation between informed and presumed consent countries is beyond the 
scope of this study. For the purposes of this study, it suffices to observe higher organ donation card 
holding for both individuals who are willing to donate and not willing to donate in informed consent 
countries.  
3.3.3 The Impact of Presumed Consent on Cadaveric Donors and Transplantations 
3.3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Interestingly, Figure 3-1 shows that Bulgaria having the lowest cadaveric donor rate and Spain 
having the highest cadaveric donor rate are both presumed consent countries. This suggests that there 
are other factors behind relative efficiency of Spain and relative inefficiency in Bulgaria which has to 
be accounted.  
Mainly following previous literature, information on a number of factors which could potentially 
impact organ donation rates such as number of deaths by specific causes, health spending, medical 
infrastructure, trust levels, religious beliefs and education level are gathered from a variety of 
sources
33
. In most cases, deceased donors were brain-dead and their hearts were artificially 
functioning with the help of ventilation machines. The most common causes of brain-death are 
homicides, motor vehicle accidents and cerebro-vascular diseases. We collected information for these 
causes of deaths from EUROSTAT. Information on health expenditure per capita and hospital beds 
per million populations as a proxy for transplant infrastructure are collected from WHO and 
EUROSTAT respectively. We also added the percentage of the population having upper secondary or 
tertiary education for each sex compiled from EUROSTAT.  
According to Eurobarometer, 2009 survey on organ donation, religious reasons, distrust in the 
system and scare of manipulation of the human body are three major causes of refusal for organ 
donation. To capture trust in the system, corruption perceptions scores from Transparency 
International are included. Corruption perception scores ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 
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(highly corrupt). To control for religiosity changes over time, I compiled percentage of population 
being Roman Catholic and having no religion
34
 mainly from four surveys. These surveys are 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP), European Social Survey (ESS), European Values Survey 
(EVS) and Eurobarometers conducted between 1999/2000 and 2010.  
Table 3-6 provides summary statistics for the sample.  









 (1) (2) (3) ((2)-(3)) 
Presumed consent country 0.74 
[0.44] 
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Number of Countries 27 20 7  
Notes: standard deviations in [ ]; standard errors in ( ).
*
 p < 0.05,
**
 p < 0.01,
***
 p < 0.001 
The first column gives statistics for the entire sample while the second and third columns restrict 
the sample to presumed and informed consent countries. The fourth column provides information 
about the difference between the second and third columns and statistical significance of the 
difference. Presumed consent countries form 74 percent of the observations in our sample. The 
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presumed consent countries have on average 16.95 cadaveric donors pmp per year, whereas informed 
consent countries have on average 13.17 cadaveric donor pmp per year. The fourth column shows that 
presumed consent countries have 3.8 more cadaveric donors per million populations per year and this 
difference is statistically significant. Cadaveric donation after brain death is even lower in informed 
consent countries. Similarly, presumed consent countries have statistically higher kidney transplant 
rate.  
There are other differences between these set of countries. In particular, deaths from homicide, 
motor vehicle accidents and cerebro-vascular diseases are higher in presumed consent countries. 
However, only motor vehicle accident difference is statistically significant. Although health 
expenditure per capita are lower in presumed consent countries in comparison to informed consent 
countries, hospital beds per capita are higher. Yet, the difference in hospital beds is not statistically 
significant. Corruption perception scores of informed consent countries are higher than that of 
presumed consent countries. Since higher corruption perception scores means more transparency, we 
can say that informed consent countries are perceived as more transparent. The difference in 
corruption perception scores is statistically significant at 5% level. No major difference is observed in 
percentage of population considering themselves as having no religion while we observe higher 
percentage of population considering themselves as Roman Catholic in presumed consent countries. 
Relative to informed consent countries, presumed consent countries have statistically lower 
percentage of upper secondary or tertiary educated male population. On the other hand, the no 
significant difference was found for the upper-secondary or tertiary educational attainment of females. 
3.3.3.2 Regression Output for Cadaveric Donation Rate 
In this section, we provide regression analysis for total cadaveric donation rate and donation after 
circulatory death. We differentiate between donation after brain death (known as heart-beating 
donation) and donation after circulatory death (known as non-heart-beating donation) since donation 
after circulatory death less efficient for transplant outcomes other than kidneys. (Cota, Burgess, & 




transplantation than donors after brain death. (NHS Blood and Transplant, 2012). Also, as a response 
to long waiting lists, more and more organs from circulatory death donors are used.  
Table 3-7 shows regression output for log cadaveric donor rate (sum of donation after circulatory 
death and donation after brain death).  
Table 3-7: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log Cadaveric Donor Rate 
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Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.037 0.655 0.664 0.741 0.755 
N 287 262 262 262 262 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Model (1) contains only a dummy variable for presumed consent legislation. According to model 
(1) cadaveric donor rate is 36% higher in presumed consent countries. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. In model (2), to treat potential confounding factors, we include baseline 




vascular diseases, health expenditure per capita, hospital beds per 100,000 population, corruption 
perception scores, percentage of population considering themselves as having no religion, percentage 
of population considering themselves as Roman Catholic, percentage of upper secondary or tertiary 
educated males, and percentage of upper secondary or tertiary educated females. According to model 
(2), the coefficient of presumed consent variable indicates 33% higher cadaveric donor rate. This 
difference is significant at 5% level.  
Model (3) includes average willingness to donate organs in each country from Eurobarometer 
surveys conducted in 2002, 2006 and 2009 to treat potential confounding effect of social acceptance 
of organ donation. According to model (3), the coefficient of presumed consent dummy variable is 
still significant after inclusion of average willingness for organ donation suggesting that the impact of 
presumed consent on cadaveric donor rate cannot be attributed to presumed consent being enacted in 
countries with higher social acceptance of organ donation.  
Since there is no country which changed legislation in the period that we consider, we could not 
estimate country fixed effects which would treat any unobserved country level heterogeneity such as 
cultural inclination towards organ donation. To capture the idea that presumed consent might be 
enacted in countries where there is different unobserved heterogeneity, we group countries in model 
(4) according to following classification in which presumed consent countries are bolded.  
(1) Ireland-UK,  
(2) Greece-Cyprus,  
(3)  Germany -Austria-Hungary (Hungary is included in here because of the historical 
connection between Hungary and Austria.  
(4) Netherlands-Belgium-Luxembourg 
(5) Estonia-Lithuania-Latvia (These countries have formed Balttransplant organization among 
each other) 
(6) Denmark-Sweden-Finland (They have formed Scandiatransplant organization among each 
other) 
(7) Poland-Czech Republic-Slovakia (Western Slavic ethnic origin)   
(8) Portugal-Spain-Italy-France (Latin ethnic origin) 
(9) Bulgaria-Romania-Croatia-Slovenia (Southern-Slavic ethnic origin and also these countries 
are known as Balkan countries) 
Model (4) also shows 35% higher donation rates in presumed consent countries when country 
group dummy variables are included in the model. These regression results suggest that presumed 




shown in the last row, model (4) explains almost three-fourth of the variance of the dependent 
variable (R
2
 =0.741).  
In model (5), we included family consent and its interaction with presumed consent to check 
whether family consent makes any difference since most of the presumed consent countries routinely 
seek family consent. Model (5) suggests that presumed consent does especially matter when it is 
combined with family consent, whereas in informed consent countries, seeking family consent has a 
negative but insignificant coefficient. This result is in line with the prediction that even if families 
make the final decision on organ donation, presumed consent laws may result in notably higher 
donation rates. This model suggests that presumed consent is primarily impacting cadaveric donor 
rate through reducing family refusals. Moreover, there is no marked differences in cadaveric donor 
rate between hard opt-out and soft-opt out countries.  
The same five models of the cadaveric donor rate are also estimated for log of brain death donors 
rate. Table 3-8 provides regression output. Overall, the regression results suggest more pronounced 
impact of presumed consent.  
Table 3-8: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log of Brain Death Donors Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Legislation      










Practicing Legislation      
  Family Consent     -0.372 
(0.279) 
  Presumed consent*Family Consent     0.647** 
(0.245) 
Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.050 0.665 0.668 0.762 0.781 
N 287 262 262 262 262 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
3.3.3.3 Regression Output for Kidney Transplantation Rate 
In this section, we provide regression analysis for the kidney transplantation rate. We used the 
same five models of the cadaveric donor rate for analyzing log kidney transplant rate. Table 3-9 
provides regression output. Model (1) shows that presumed consent countries have 33% higher kidney 




regression results, model (2) and (3) reports that presumed consent countries have statistically 
significantly higher kidney transplant rate. In model (4), when country group dummy variables are 
included, presumed consent countries are found to have 31% higher kidney transplant rate. A similar 
pattern emerges from model (5) as in cadaveric donor rate. Presumed consent increases kidney 
transplant rate when it is combined with family consent. In line with intuition, family consent in 
informed countries has a negative; yet insignificant coefficient.  
Table 3-9: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log Kidney Transplant Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Legislation      
















Practicing Legislation      
  Family Consent     -0.180 
(0.315) 




Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.030 0.614 0.615 0.737 0.756 
N 296 270 270 270 270 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
Overall, the regression results from Table 3-7 and 3-9 suggest that presumed consent countries 
have 28 to 32% higher cadaveric donation and 27 to 31% higher kidney transplant rates in comparison 
to informed consent countries.  
We conducted a number of robustness checks such as inclusion of year fixed effects and 
exclusion of Spain from the sample. Weighted least squares regression is also estimated in which 
weighting proportional to size of population is used together with adjustments according to absolute 
value of the residual. Details of these tests are reported in Appendix C.   
3.4 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss whether the observed effects were attributable to presumed consent 
effects. For instance, Healy (2005) suggests that presumed consent is an indicator of a country’s 
commitment to organ donation rather than a causal mechanism in itself. Secondly, we discuss 




A country’s commitment to organ donation could be indicated by available transplant capacity. In 
our main analysis, transplantation capacity is imperfectly proxied by number of hospital beds per 
100,000 people. We include natural logarithm of number of kidney transplant centers per million 
populations as an additional control variable in Table 3-10. Model (1) and (2) in Table 3-10 uses the 
same specifications as of model (3) and (4) in Table 3-7 with logarithm of number of transplantation 
centers per million population as an additional control variable. Table 3-10 reports increased 
coefficient of presumed consent compared to Table 3-7. This finding suggests that commitment to 
organ transplantation proxied by kidney transplant infrastructure is negatively correlated with 
presumed consent legislation.  
Kidney transplant capacity (defined as the number of kidney transplant centers per million 
populations) could also influence kidney transplantation rates. Therefore; we also examine how 
inclusion of kidney transplant centers changes the kidney transplantation rate regression results. 
Model (3) and (4) in Table 3-10 uses the same specifications as of model (3) and (4) in Table 3-9 with 
logarithm of number of transplantation centers per million population as an additional control variable. 
Models (3) and (4) also reports increased coefficient of presumed consent compared to Table 3-9. 
This finding also suggests negative correlation between transplant commitment proxied by kidney 
transplant capacity and presumed consent legislation.  
Table 3-10: Transplant Infrastructure and Presumed Consent (Pooled OLS)  
 Log Cadaveric Donor 
Rate 
 Log Kidney 
Transplant Rate 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Legislation      








Transplant Infrastructure      








Baseline Controls + +  + + 
Average willingness to donate + -  + - 
Country Group Fixed Effects - +  - + 
R-squared 0.778 0.828  0.772 0.836 
N 153 153  153 153 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
On the whole, the results of Table 3-10 suggest that the regression results provided in Table 3-7 




Concerning disadvantages, both presumed consent and informed consent legislation are error-
prone. In presumed consent legislation, non-willing individuals’ organs could be mistakenly removed 
if they did not register their non-willingness. (Gill, 2004; Orentlicher, 2008) In this case, removal of 
an organ is wrong because it is against the patient’s will. In informed consent countries, willing 
individuals’ organs could be mistakenly not removed if they did not register their willingness. (Gill, 
2004; Orentlicher, 2008) In this case, non-removal of an organ is a waste of a scarce resource which 
could be used for improving life of another person. So, in both types, there is a possibility that some 
people’s wishes are not respected.  
Using descriptive information from Table 3-2 and Table 3-4, we can calculate which consent 
regime produces the least percentage of errors. Similarly, we can calculate which consent regime 
maximizes the percentage of people whose wishes are respected. As discussed, socially desirable 
responding would not change our conclusions as long as individuals from informed and presumed 
consent regimes are not different regard to their engagement in socially desirable responding.  
The probability of making mistake in presumed consent legislation is 43% which is calculated by 
multiplying the percentage of non-willing individuals with the probability of non-registering their 
preference (= (100-55.83)*(100-1.56)/100). The probability of making mistake in informed consent 
legislation is 37.71 which is given by multiplying the percentage of willing individuals with the 
probability of non-registering their preference (=55.56*(100-32.11)/100).  If the default consent 
regime should be chosen such that the least number of errors are made, informed consent regime 
seems to be superior.  
The percentage of people whose wishes are respected in informed consent regime is the ones who 
are not willing to donate (25.45%) plus the ones who are willing to donate and registered their 
preference (=55.56*32.11/100). This corresponds to 43.29%.  The percentage of people whose wishes 
are respected in presumed consent regime is the ones who are willing to donate (55.83%) plus the 
ones who are not willing to donate and registered their preference (=26.99*1.56/100). This 
corresponds to 56.25%. If the criterion for choosing the default consent regime is to maximize the 
percentage of people whose wishes are respected, presumed consent seems to outperform inform 





How to produce larger number of organ donors is a relevant question since the chronic shortage of 
human organs is leading to loss of many patients while waiting for an organ in Europe as in other 
places. One proposition by medical professionals and some politicians in informed consent countries 
such as the UK and Netherlands is changing legislative defaults on organ donation to presumed 
consent. However, less is known whether presumed consent is effective for increasing cadaveric 
donation rates. Some previous studies find higher organ donation rates in presumed consent countries, 
the evidence was not quite convincing. Moreover, there is no consensus in the literature on whether 
the presumed consent legislation is an indicator of a country’s commitment to organ donation or a 
causal mechanism in itself.  
In this study, we attempt to extend the literature on how presumed consent impacts cadaveric 
donors and kidney transplantations in the EU-27 countries plus Croatia in the period 2000-2010. As a 
first step, we show evidence that presumed consent is not necessarily legislated in countries where 
there is higher social acceptance of organ donation. For presumed consent to be effective, individuals 
should fail to register their preferences in case of a mismatch with their preference and legislative 
default. In the second step, we show that people fail to take action in line with their preferences, this is 
especially more relevant for individuals who are non-willing to donate their organs. Therefore, we 
suggest that presumed consent is likely to produce higher organ donors. In the main analysis, after 
accounting for potential confounding factors, our estimates suggest that presumed consent countries 
have 28 to 32% higher cadaveric donation and 27 to 31% higher kidney transplant rates in comparison 
to informed consent countries.  
Changing defaults to presumed consent has its advantages and disadvantages. Although our study 
indicates that presumed consent legislation can be instrumental for saving lives, we do not claim that 
changing the system would be ideal from every aspect. If policy makers attribute more importance to 















 No GODT 
 
Belgium Yes 
(Gevers, Janssen, & 
Friele, 2004) Yes 
(Gevers, Janssen, & 
Friele, 2004) 
Bulgaria Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Croatia Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Cyprus Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Czech 
Republic Yes GODT No GODT 
Denmark No (Abadie & Gay, 2005) No (Bilgel, 2010) 
Estonia Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Finland Yes (Abadie & Gay, 2005) Yes GODT 
France Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Germany No GODT No GODT 
Greece Yes (Abadie & Gay, 2005) Yes GODT 
Hungary Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Ireland No GODT Yes GODT 
Italy Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Latvia Yes GODT No (Paparde, 2010) 
Lithuania No GODT Yes GODT 
Luxembourg Yes GODT No GODT 
Netherlands No (Abadie & Gay, 2005) Yes (Bilgel, 2010) 
Poland Yes (Abadie & Gay, 2005) No (Bilgel, 2010) 
Portugal Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Romania No GODT Yes GODT 
Slovakia Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Slovenia Yes (Abadie & Gay, 2005) Yes GODT 
Spain Yes GODT Yes GODT 
Sweden Yes (Abadie & Gay, 2005) No GODT 
United 
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Appendix B: Sources of Data  
B.1. Aggregate Country Level Data  
The data for cadaveric organ donation rates are mainly from The International Registry in Organ 
Donation and Transplantation (IRODaT) of Transplantation Procurement Management. If the value is 
is missing in IRODaT, we checked Transplant Newsletters of corresponding years and used the 
corresponding values. The data for kidney transplantations are also from The International Registry in 
Organ Donation and Transplantation (IRODaT) of Transplantation Procurement Management. If the 
value is is missing in IRODaT, we checked Global Transplant Observatory and used the 
corresponding values. If the value is also not available in Global Transplant Observatory, we also 
checked Transplant Newsletters of corresponding years and used the corresponding values. 
Homicide rates are available only till 2010 from EUROSTAT webpage. The missing figures from 
EUROSTAT are replaced by available figures from UN’s homicide database. Deaths caused by 
Cebrebro vascular diseases for all ages and all sexes are available untill 2010 from EUROSTAT 
webpage. The missing values from EUROSTAT are replaced by available values from WHO’s World 
Mortality Database. Deaths caused by transport accidents rates are also obtained from EUROSTAT’s 
webpage. The missing values from EUROSTAT are replaced by available values from WHO’s 
Mortality Database.  
For health spending, total expenditure on health per capita PPP is obtained from the WHO’s 
webpage.   Hospital beds per 1000 people are obtained from EUROSTAT’s webpage.  The missing 
values are replaced by available values from the World Bank Database’s webpage.  
For trust in the system, corruption perception scores compiled by Transparency International are 
obtained from the webpage. For education, persons with upper secondary or tertiary educational 
attainments for both sexes are obtained from EUROSTAT’s webpage.  
For capturing religious preference changes over time, percentage of population being Roman 
Catholic and having no religion are compiled from mainly International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP), European Social Survey (ESS), European Values Survey (EVS) and Eurobarometers 
conducted between 1999/2000 and 2010. People having no religion are the people who consider 




country for the same year from different surveys, weighted average of these values is used.  Figure 3-
3 shows no religion rate estimates for each country in the sample from the surveys.  In general, Figure 
3-3 shows small shifts or no shifts over time probably due the short time span covered. Except for six 
countries (Belgium, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom), estimates from 
three surveys show a consistent pattern.  
The number of kidney transplant centers is obtained from Transplant Newsletters of Spanish 
Organ Transplantations Agency.  The information was available from 2003 to 2011. 









































































Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia
Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia
Finland France Germany Greece
Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia
Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Poland
Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia
Spain Sweden United Kingdom
average no-religion rate estimates from ISSP
















B.2. Eurobarometer Surveys 
Firstly, we use individual level data from Eurobarometer Surveys conducted in 2002, 2006 and 
2009. The first one is Eurobarometer 58.2:  Health and Developing Countries. This survey has 
respondents from 15 EU countries before the enlargement in 2004. The sample size is 16,230 
individuals. The second one is Eurobarometer 66.2: Nuclear Energy and Safety, and Public Health 
Issues. This survey has respondents from all 27 EU countries also from Croatia and the Turkish 
Cypriot Community. The sample size is 28,584 individuals. The last one is Eurobarometer 72.3: 
Public Health Attitudes, Behavior, and Prevention. This survey has respondents from all 27 EU 
countries, Croatia, Turkey, Turkish Cypriot Community and Macedonia (FYROM). The sample size 
is 30,292 individuals.  
The Eurobarometer surveys is based on multi-stage national probability samples of the citizens of 
participating countries aged 15 and over and carried out on behalf of the European Commission. The 
surveys are representative of the whole territory of the countries included in the analysis. These 


















Appendix C: Robustness Checks 
Table C-1: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log Cadeveric Donor Rate (Excluding Spain) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















  Family Consent     -0.267 
(0.339) 




Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.029 0.645 0.651 0.735 0.749 
N 276 251 251 251 251 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
 
Table C-2: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log Cadeveric Donor Rate (Year Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















  Family Consent     -0.391 
(0.381) 




Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.037 0.666 0.678 0.749 0.763 
N 287 262 262 262 262 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
 
Table C-3: Weighted OLS Estimates of Log Cadaveric Donor Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


























Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.038 0.675 0.687 0.763 0.778 










Table C-4: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log Kidney Transplant Rate (Excluding Spain) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 














  Family Consent     -0.152 
(0.314) 




Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.024 0.605 0.605 0.731 0.751 
N 285 259 259 259 259 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
 
 
Table C-5: Pooled OLS Estimates of Log Kidney Transplant Rate (Year Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 














  Family Consent     -0.347 
(0.379) 




Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.030 0.619 0.621 0.745 0.764 
N 296 270 270 270 270 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at country level, 
*
 p < .1, 
**
 p < .05, 
***
 p < .01 
 
 
Table C-6: Weighted OLS Estimates of Log Kidney Transplant Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


















  Family Consent     -0.134 
(0.157) 




Baseline Controls - + + + + 
Country Group Fixed Effects - - - + + 
R-squared 0.030 0.619 0.621 0.745 0.764 




4 Donate More, Be Happier! 
4.1 Introduction 
Making donations is a form of pro-social behavior. Why people donate is an interesting question 
from an economics point of view since people give away their money for free. The economics 
literature considers a number of motivations, including signaling one’s social status, enhancing one’s 
reputation, and acquiring tax-break advantages (Glazer & Kondrad 1996; Harbaugh 1998; Clotfelter  
1985). Some argue that people have a taste for giving; they experience a “warm glow” from having 
“done their bit” (Andreoni, 1989; 1990).  
To put the warm glow motivation into context, we have to make a distinction between pure 
altruism and impure altruism at this point. Economists describe a person as an altruist if other peoples’ 
welfare enters into that person’s utility function. A person is pure altruist if she only cares for the final 
situation of the other person regardless of what she personally did for the other person, whereas an 
impure altruist would enjoy not only the final situation but also her own deed.  
In large economies, under the assumption of non-cooperative equilibria, warm-glow motive must 
dominate at the margin (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002). The intuition is that the incentive to free ride must 
be so overwhelming if large numbers of others are collectively providing a substantial amount of 
charity, the only justification for giving is that donors get some direct benefit from giving.  
There are several channels why humans may have pleasurable psychological experiences by 
acting pro-socially. Firstly, humans feel sympathy or empathy for the needs of another human being 
which might drive pro-social behavior.  Being aware of those in need and ignoring any possible help 
would result in feelings of shame and guilt. Pro-social behavior may alleviate those feelings. 
Moreover, pro-social behavior can make one feel proud of oneself by acting in line with a certain self-
image or social norm.  
Although the “warm glow” hypothesis has existed since the 1980s, to the author’s knowledge, in 
the economics literature, no study measures the magnitude of the effect of donating on subjective 
wellbeing using real donation amounts. Previous economics literature on “warm glow” is largely 




of impure altruism or warm glow (Andreoni 1989; 1990; Crumpler and Grossman 2008). Therefore, 
whether donating makes people happier in a causal way remains unanswered, partly because 
happiness is not thought to be in the area of economics. However, Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009) 
argue that it is possible to collect meaningful and reliable data on both subjective and objective well-
being. Subjective wellbeing encompasses evaluation of one’s life and happiness which are collected 
by questions on how one feels in surveys. 
Psychologists have worked on the relationship between happiness and pro-social behavior and 
have produced three strands of literature. One argues that pro-social behavior promotes happiness. 
Donors self-report “feeling good” as a motive for donating to charitable causes. In Wunderink (2002), 
57% of respondents mention “gives me a good feeling” as a motivation for making donations in the 
Netherlands. Another strand produces experimental evidence that happiness increases charitable 
behavior. Researchers find participants more likely to help others after experiencing a positive mood 
(Aderman, 1972; Rosenhan, Underwood and Moore, 1974; Forgas, Dunn and Granland, 2008). 
Finally, some researchers say that certain personality characteristics might foster both giving and 
happiness. For instance, in Bekkers (2006), extroverted individuals who are generally happier are also 
found to be more likely to give. 
The psychology literature exploring the benefits of charitable giving is largely experimental and 
has conducted on small groups of students or volunteers, including Field et al. (1998), Lyubomirsky, 
Sheldon and Schkade (2005) and Dunn, Aknin and Norton (2008), leaving open the question of the 
external validity of results.  
Understanding donating is important as donations matter economically. The total value of 
monetary and goods donated by Dutch households in 2009 amounts to € 1,938 million (Schuyt, 
Gouwenberg, & Bekkers, 2011). The average donation by all households in 2009 in the form of cash 
and goods is calculated to be €210.  This issue is relevant, since 87% of Dutch households donate 
money to charitable organizations
36
 (Schuyt, Gouwenberg, & Bekkers, 2011). 
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 In 2010, 41% of the Dutch population was engaged as a volunteer in unpaid work for a social organization at 





In this study, we examine whether charitable giving makes people happier taking into account the 
potential reverse causality and personality related fixed factors. For this purpose, we employ two 
panel datasets from the Netherlands:  five waves of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social 
Sciences (LISS) panel and four waves of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel (GINP). The LISS 
includes a happiness score for each wave from 2007 to 2012. In the GINP, a life satisfaction measure 
is available for the 2006 wave; self-reported health is available in four waves measured biannually 
from 2004 to 2010. To avoid dropping observations, we use self-reported health as a proxy for 
subjective wellbeing. The GINP asks whether the respondent has made a donation in the previous two 
weeks; the LISS panel asks about donations in the last 12 months. This difference makes the GINP 
more useful to detect short-term effects.    
Exploiting the panel nature of both the LISS panel and the GINP, we initially run fixed effects 
models. However, fixed effects specification is not enough to say something about direction of 
causality. To identify the direction of causality, we employ an instrumental variables approach. We 
use different types of personal solicitation as instruments for donating since the literature suggests that 
solicitation is an effective way to induce people to make charitable donations (Meer and Rosen 2011; 
Bekkers 2005; Van Diepen, Donkers and Franses 2006).  
The GINP panel asks respondents whether they have been solicited in the last two weeks by 13 
different fundraising methods. If we think about donation as a normal good, donors constitute the 
supply side of this market and charities constitute the demand side of the market. Using “solicitation” 
as instrument is plausible since it comes from the demand side of the market. Also, the solicitation of 
money puts social pressure on prospective donors and increases the likelihood that they will agree to 
donate. Although a prospective donor may want to donate, she or he may not because of an 
information gap. For instance, they might not know who needs money the most and how to send it. 
Charities through solicitation can supply this information. Also, successful solicitation strategies may 
enhance the probability of giving by raising awareness of needs for donation and ensuring donors that 
their gift makes a difference.  
The 13 types of solicitation as our instrument set are jointly significant in explaining donation 




rests on the assumption that types of solicitation does not affect subjective wellbeing directly. The 
main concern with using personal solicitation information is that charities might target some people 
rather than others and this might be related to subjective wellbeing in an unobserved way. Charities 
are known to concentrate their solicitation efforts on affluent potential contributors.  Since charities 
generally target people with higher economic wellbeing, this does not suggest that there is targeting 
on the basis of psychological wellbeing because evidence suggests that money does not necessarily 
lead to greater happiness after a certain threshold (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). Also, I do control for 
indicators of income in the regression model.  
From the fixed effect estimates of the LISS panel, which primarily measure long-term effects, we 
find evidence that engaging in donation is associated with higher happiness scores. From the fixed 
effect estimates of the GINP, which show short-run effects, we do not find any significant relationship 
between donating and subjective health. We find a concave relationship between donating and life 
satisfaction using the OLS for the 2006 wave of GINP. For the IV estimates using GINP, contrary to 
intuition, we find negative effect of donating on subjective health. When experience of certain 
diseases is taken into account, the effect is no longer significant. This suggests that being solicited is 
negatively correlated with health status. In line with our expectation, we find a significant effect of 
donating on life satisfaction using an IV methodology for the 2006 wave GINP. Solicitation reflecting 
selection cannot explain the results that we observe for life-satisfaction.  
To put the findings from IV estimation, we can compare the coefficient of income from 
employment and coefficient of amound donated. This comparison suggest that an increase of €1 in 
donations increases life satisfaction as much as a €104 increase in income from employment for those 
who was affected by solicitation. At first, the effect might seem implausible. However, this is the 
local average treatment effect (LATE) for individuals who donate an extra Euro because they are 
solicited and these individuals would not donate this extra Euro if they were not solicited.  This group 
of individuals is not likely to be representative of the Dutch population. Thus, IV estimates might not 
reflect the average treatment effect. Moreover, the opt-in nature of the GINPS sampling also casts 




For discussing the policy implications, the average treatment effect would be more useful. 
Nevertheless, the main message of this study - donation makes at least some people happier-, could 
have policy implications for boosting charitable giving. Under rationality, people are thought to make 
optimal decisions in which they are supposed to take into account psychological benefit of donation in 
their utility function. At first, since a large number of people already donated and people can learn the 
psychological benefits of donation over time, rationality seems to be a valid assumption. Rationality 
does not leave room for advertising psychological benefits of donation to affect donation amounts. 
However, evidence reveals that people overlook the benefits of charitable giving. Dunn, Aknin and 
Norton (2008) showed that people erroneously thought that personal spending would make them 
happier than pro-social spending although they found higher happiness levels of randomly assigned 
pro-social spenders.  Frank (2004) discusses the evidence on how people do not spend their money in 
ways that yield significant and lasting increases in measured satisfaction. Therefore, there might be 
still room for increasing subjective wellbeing by engaging in pro-social behavior.   
4.2 Literature Review 
As noted above, there are three strands of literature on the relationship between pro-social 
behavior
37
 and subjective wellbeing: one argues that being pro-social promotes happiness; the second 
says happier people are more likely to be pro-social; the third argues that personality traits is driving 
happiness and pro-social behavior. 
38
. 
The first strand dates back to Aristotle’s concept of eudemonia which could be summarized as 
happiness from performing moral duties. Recent evidence from neuropsychological studies suggests 
that donations to charity “elicit neural activity similar to experience of pleasure” (Harbaugh, Myer and 
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 There are different forms of pro-social behavior. In this study, we focus on donating money. 
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 Dolan, Peasgood, & White (2008) provide a brief overview of the literature on volunteering and subjective 
well-being relationship. Two studies from this literature are Meier and Stutzer (2008), Field et al (1998). Meier 
and Stutzer (2008) find higher levels of volunteer work to be associated with higher levels of overall life 
satisfaction. They use German Socioeconomic Panel data after the fall of the Berlin Wall but before German 
reunification when volunteering opportunities dropped dramatically in East Germany. This quasi-experiment 
allows them to compare happiness of East Germans to a control group who did not experience a change in their 
volunteering status. Field et al. (1998) find that elderly volunteers experience less anxiety and depression and 
enjoy improved health after being asked to give infants a massage. Fully covering the literature on volunteering 
and subjective wellbeing is beyond the scope of this study and not directly relevant for measuring the warm 





Burghart 2007; Tankersley, Stowe and Huettel 2007; Moll et al. 2006). Social psychologists have 
shown that acting pro-socially may contribute to less anxiety and depression and a more positive 
mood. Lyubomirsky, Sheldon and Schkade (2005) show that asking people to commit random acts of 
kindness can significantly increase happiness levels for several weeks. Spending money on others is 
also found to increase happiness more than spending money on oneself (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 
2008). Researchers randomly assigned some students to spend money on others and some to spend 
money on themselves; the former were significantly happier at the end of the day. However, Dunn, 
Aknin, & Norton (2008)’s are not really capturing the subjective wellbeing effect of donations since 
donation by definition should be voluntary.  
In the second strand, experimental evidence shows that happiness increases charitable behavior. 
The majority of the experimental research has included mood inductions such as having participants 
read mood inducing statements (Aderman, 1972), recalling mood appropriate memories (Rosenhan, 
Underwood, & Moore, 1974), receiving cookies (Isen & Levin, 1972). Researchers find participants 
more likely to help others after experiencing a positive mood. A positive mood also increases helpful 
behavior in the workplace (Forgas, Dunn, & Granland, 2008). Using survey data, Wang and Graddy 
(2008) find that happiness affects religious giving but not secular giving; they argue that happy people 
are more emotionally able to help others and have more optimistic personalities, thus fostering 
charitable giving. In the workplace, employees who report being in a good mood are more likely to 
display helpful behaviors that are not part of their formal job requirements (Williams & Shiaw, 1999). 
A third strand argues that certain personality characteristics might foster both giving and 
happiness. A survey in the United Kingdom finds that people who report a stronger sense of 
accomplishment are more likely to donate (Sargeant, Ford, & West, 2000). A study in New Zealand 
finds that people with a passive life orientation are less likely to donate (Todd & Lawson, 1999). A 
similar finding emerges from a study in the Netherlands in which more extroverted individuals are 
more likely to give and to give higher amounts (Bekkers, 2006). There is also growing evidence in 
psychological research that personality traits such as extroversion are important predictors of reported 




In short, evidence on the effect of donating on subjective wellbeing has been largely based on 
experimental studies with relatively small sample sizes and amounts donated; whether donating 
actually causes greater happiness remains partly unanswered. 
While no study has used solicitation an instrument, many consider the stimulant effect of 
solicitation on donation. For instance, there is evidence that giving typically occurs in response to 
solicitation (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007). One study finds 85% of gifts are made following 
solicitation (Bryant et al. 2003); similarly, Bekkers (2005) finds that 86% of donations follow 
solicitation. Yoruk (2009) documents a positive relationship between personal solicitation and total 
charitable giving. Van Diepen, Donkers and Franses (2006) find that direct mailing solicitations 
increase giving to a group of charitable institutions in the Netherlands. A similar finding is observed 
for alumni donations in natural experiment setting (Meer & Rosen, 2011). The evidence that 
solicitations enhance the likelihood of donating is complemented by field work showing that personal 
solicitations are more effective than anonymous fundraising methods (Landry et al. 2006; Alpizar, 
Carlson and Johansson-Stenman 2008).  
4.3 Empirical Framework 
We are interested in estimating the impact of pro-social behavior (i.e., donating) on happiness. Let 
  represent an outcome such as a happiness score, subjective health score or life satisfaction score,   
represent observable personal characteristics, and    denote pro-social behavior. For person "  , then, 
the model can be written as  
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                
The treatment effect     will be positive if pro-social behavior increases happiness after 
controlling for an extensive set of covariates denoted by X in equation (1).  
Pro-social behavior will be affected by observable personal characteristics,    , unobserved 
characteristics,  , and by the activities of charitable organizations, iZ  as in equation (2).  As 




social behavior. As donating means giving money away, this necessarily imposes financial costs on 
donors. Therefore, an individual’s financial resources are potentially correlated with the amount of 
donation. To account for potential correlations, employment status and net monthly income from 
employment variables are included in X. We include indicators for volunteering in X to treat possible 
correlations between volunteers and donors; if generous people are more likely to donate, they might 
also be more likely to volunteer. One could argue that the coefficient of donating or volunteering 
might indicate something about sociability of the respondent rather than the effect of donating or 
volunteering per se. Therefore, being a member of a social organization and participating in an event 
in social organization are included in X as independent variables to account for sociability differences.   
One critical issue in estimating the impact of pro-social behavior on subjective wellbeing is that 
subjective wellbeing levels might not be comparable between individuals. In this case, cross-sectional 
analysis is invalid. Another issue is self-selection of individuals into being pro-social. In other words, 
if certain personality types are more likely to be pro-social and also to report higher subjective 
wellbeing, then the difference in reported subjective wellbeing scores between donors and non-donors 
may be due to unobserved personality types. To address these issues, we would need panel data since 
with these, the same person’s subjective wellbeing could be compared over time. Moreover, time-
invariant personality factors are cancelled out by examining the same person over time. Thus, fixed 
effects models will give an unbiased estimate of the effect of donating on subjective health if the only 
source of endogeneity is fixed personality related heterogeneity.  
As reverse causality is also an issue (there is evidence that induced happiness makes people more 
likely to donate), instrumental variable (IV) techniques should be used. The estimation of IV requires 
an instrument which gives an exogenous variation of pro-social behavior. That is, we look for 
instruments which will impact a person’s decision to be pro-social without affecting his or her 
subjective wellbeing directly. For instance, solicitation could be an instrument for donation since 
some people are asked to donate to charitable causes while others are not. The solicitation instrument 
set that may potentially affect donation behavior contains fourteen binary variables. These are as 
follows: Person was asked to donate  (1) via door to door collection; (2) via street collection; (3) via 




campaign or telethon; (7) via a direct mail letter; (8) via internet/e-mail; (9) via collection during an 
event; (10) via collection through membership organization; (11) via advertisement; (12) via buying 
something; (13) via lottery tickets. 
For our IV estimates to be consistent and valid, three conditions must hold. First, the instruments 
should be “relevant” for donating decision. Secondly, exclusion restrictions must hold. Thirdly, 
monotonicity should not be violated.  
For the first condition, there are several reasons for solicitation being a relevant determinant of 
donating. The solicitation of money puts social pressure on the individuals asked and increases the 
likelihood that they will agree to donate. Successful solicitation strategies may enhance the 
probability of giving by raising awareness of needs and assuring donors that their gift makes a 
difference. Some people donate even though they are not asked to do so, but we expect that the 
propensities to donate will be lower than among those who are asked.  
We expect a positive relationship between the solicitation and the ensuing donation. However, 
that is not enough. We need to make sure that instruments are highly correlated with the variable they 
instrument for, in this case, amount donated and donated dummy. This is commonly judged by 
examining an F-test on the instruments in a regression of the endogenous variable on the instruments 
(the first stage). Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) suggested that this F-statistic should be large and 
statistically significant; as a rule of thumb, Staiger and Stock (1997) say that an F-statistic of less than 
10 could signal weak instruments.  
Secondly, exclusion restrictions must also hold; instruments should be uncorrelated with the 
unobserved characteristics that can affect subjective wellbeing. We need to make sure that solicitation 
does not impact happiness directly. People might not like to be asked for money, and this might affect 
their happiness negatively; if so, our results might be the lower bound of the effect of donation on 
subjective wellbeing. However, the exclusion restriction would also be violated in the case of 




4.3.1 How do charities work? 
Although charities are non-profit organizations, their strategies for fundraising are more like 
enterprises: they work with direct mailings, the internet, and television.  To increase their funds, they 
frequently try to promote donating through solicitation. The fundraising process employs both 
impersonal methods such as television campaigns and personal methods such as collection via a 
membership organization. Both types of solicitation increase the likelihood of contributions.  For our 
analysis to be valid, we must ask and answer the following question: “Does solicitation matter 
because it stimulates potential donors or because it targets those who are already likely to donate” 
Solicitation as a selection strategy: Given limited time and resources, charities cannot possibly 
solicit everybody to donate for a particular goal. As a result, seeking to maximize both efficiency and 
the probability of donation, they target those with donation potential. To this end, many charitable 
organizations keep detailed records of all individuals who have donated to their charity in the past 
(Jonker, Paap, & Franses, 2000). They draw heavily on their own mailing lists to improve target 
selection. Potential donors are often selected based on their behavior in the past. When direct mailing 
is used, often Recency, Frequency, and Monetary value (RFM) are the only criteria for target 
selection (Jonker, Paap, & Franses, 2000). Recency measures duration since an individual’s last 
donation. Frequency counts an individual’s positive responses to mailings during a certain period of 
time. Lastly, monetary value shows the amount of donation during a certain period of time. The RFM 
variables are used in direct marketing techniques. They are often combined into an individual score, 
which is then used to rank the individuals who are most likely to respond (Bauer, 1988). In other 
words, individuals targeted for solicitation tend to be more likely to donate in the first place. Those 
solicited are likely have a higher income, be better educated, and have wide networks in the 
community. 
Solicitation as a Stimulus: Solicitation may also influence contribution decisions by acting as a 
stimulus that mobilizes potential contributors and increases the likelihood of contributing in ways that 
are independent of targeting. Solicitations for money reduce the information costs associated with 




information about who needs money and when and how much. By providing such information, 
solicitations reduce the costs of participation and may increase the probability of assent.   
While charities identify their potential donor pool, there is also an element of randomization 
because from this pool, they solicit a subset of individuals randomly. For instance, in Jonker, Paap 
and Franses (2000), 5,300 individuals are selected randomly out of 800,000 individuals from a large 
charitable organization’s database in the Netherlands. Similarly, in field-work conducted by Huck and 
Rasul (2011) direct mail solicitations for a charitable cause were sent to individuals. The individuals 
were randomly selected from a database of persons who had purchased at least one ticket to attend 
either the opera or ballet in the 12 months prior to the mail-out.  In our context, randomization is more 
likely to be the issue, since we consider solicitation in the previous two weeks.  
Charities might target happy and healthy individuals for volunteer work since such activities often 
require physical and psychological effort. However, for the solicitation of donations, there is no 
explicit targeting based on happiness or health. While income is targeted, evidence suggests that 
money does not necessarily lead to greater happiness after a certain threshold is reached (Kahneman 
& Deaton, 2010). Therefore, we do not expect psychological better to be selected by income targeted.  
Even so, in the regression model, I do control for indicators of income.   
For the identification of the effects of donating through IV approach, exclusion restrictions means 
that the instruments for donation should have no direct effect on subjective health. The nature of some 
of the instruments raises concerns about the validity of the assumption. For instance, one concern is 
that, a person has to be healthy enough to go out for coming across to a street collection. To address 
this concern, I control for experience of physical diseases. Moreover, the GINP survey is conducted 
through internet. Therefore, the respondents of this survey should be able to use computer and internet. 
If their physical or mental health would be so bad, they would not be able to answer the questions at 
the first place.  
The exclusion restrictions cannot be tested formally. But if solicitation is randomly conducted, 
then it should be unrelated to the respondent’s personal characteristics. Often randomization is not 
possible. Nevertheless, we can consider whether observables,  are balanced across differences in  . If 




are similar among solicited and unsolicited. There could still be concern that unobserved 
characteristics are related to Z. Therefore, one needs to make a decision whether the set of instruments 
are successful in leading to treatment that is “as good as random” or not.   
Moreover, solicitation may not affect everybody in the same way. For instance, generous people 
who have more inclination to be pro-social might donate more than less generous people in response 
to a solicitation. That is, there could be heterogeneous effects. However, in model (2) we propose a 
linear model where the effect of solicitation on pro-social behavior is assumed to be constant.  Even if 
the treatment effects are heterogeneous, Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that under the 
“monotonicity” assumption, IV estimates remain valid. The monotonicity assumption requires that the 
solicitation either has no effect on pro-social behavior or it influences pro-social behavior in the same 
direction whenever it has any impact. For instance, if people get disturbed by solicitation and give less 
than her intended amount, monotonicity assumption is violated.   
Under these assumptions, IV results yield the local average treatment effect (LATE) for donors 
who donated because they are asked to do so, but would not donate if they were not asked.  
4.4 Data 
We employ two datasets for the empirical analysis. The first is the Longitudinal Internet Studies 
for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel of Centerdata; the second is the Giving in the Netherlands Panel 
(GNIP).  
We use five waves of individual-level data from the LISS collected annually between 2007 and 
2012. The LISS contains 5000 households, comprising 8000 individuals. It is based on a true 
probability sample of households drawn from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. As its 
name suggests, it is internet based panel. However, households that cannnot otherwise participate are 
provided with a computer and Internet connection. LISS panel members get an incentive payment of € 
7.5 per half-hour of interview time.  
The respondent is asked whether s/he has performed voluntary work or donated money for many 
different types of organizations, including a sports/outdoor activities club, a cultural association or 




peace organization, animal rights organization etc. These questions are used to construct volunteer 
and donated dummy variables. The question for measuring volunteering time is the following: 
“Considered all together, how much time do you spend on voluntary work per week, on average? 
(Including hours that you possibly spend on informal care)”. For measuring the amount of donation, 
the question asked in 2009 and 2010 is the following: “For donations & gifts (for family, friends, 
charity etc), please indicate how many Euros you spend on this personally per month, on average 
(considering last 12 months)”. Although questions from which donated and volunteer dummy 
variables are derived are administered in all 5 waves, amount of donation is only available for two 
waves. Therefore, the number of observations for donation amount is lower.  
In addition to questions on volunteering and donations, LISS respondents are asked their overall 
happiness. As our dependent variable, we use the respondents’ happiness, derived from the following 
question: “On the whole, how happy would you say you are?” with 11 possible categories ranging 
from 0 “totally unhappy” to 10 “totally happy”. The LISS panel has many variables that can be 
controlled for. Personal status related covariates include self-reported health status, having a long-
standing disease, days hospitalized, as well as a set of socio-economic status related variables such as 
gender, age, urbanity of residence, education level, labor market status, monthly net income, number 
of household members, number of children living at home, marital status, whether the respondent is a 




From the full sample of (N=29,264
40
), we use a subset of 22,560
41
 person years, although the 
number of observations varies depending on the availability of data for the control variable. We drop 
observations from the sample if the volunteer or donation status information is not available (1,753 
cases). Self reported health is not available in 3,043 cases; long-standing illness is not available in 15 
cases; days hospitalized is not available in 71 cases; marital status are not available in 554 cases; place 
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 The LISS panel contains many variables on personality which may be important for donating behavior. We 
did not use these personality variables in our analysis because longitudinal nature of the data allows for 
controlling time-invariant personality factors.  
40
 n= 9887, T=5 and the panel is unbalanced.  
41




of residence not available in 22 cases, income is missing or the respondent does not want to reply in 
1,213 cases; education is missing in 33 cases.  
 We also use four waves of individual-level data out of five waves from the Giving in the 
Netherlands Panel collected biannually since 2004 because the 2002 wave does not have subjective 
health measure. This dataset has been used as the basis for macro-economic estimates of giving in the 
Netherlands. The GINP is a random sample of individuals from pool of 40,000 households available 
to NIPO (Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion). The pool is representative of the Dutch population 
with respect to gender, age, level of education, home ownership, household size and region. 
Completing a survey is rewarded with a number of token points depending on the length of the survey 
completed. At the end of the survey, the points can be exchanged for a voucher or alternatively, for a 
donation to a charitable cause.  
In May-June 2002, a representative sample of 1,707 individuals completed the GINPS. The 
baseline sample was followed up in May of 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. There is both entry into and 
exit from the panel, leading to unbalanced data with an increasing number of individual interviews 
over time. Unfortunately, a measure of subjective wellbeing is available only for the 2006 wave. 
Since a subjective health measure is available in four waves from 2004 to 2010, we also used 
subjective health as a dependent variable. The question for measuring subjective health is “What do 
you think about your health in general?” with five possible categories ranging from 1, “Bad,” to 5, 
“Excellent”.  
Respondents are asked to report whether they donated and the amount donated as a result of 13 
different types of fundraising efforts in the previous two weeks. The total amount of the donation is 
calculated based on answers given to these questions. The amount donated is not asked in the 2004 
wave, only whether the respondent has donated or not is asked in 2004 wave, therefore the number of 
observations for the amount donated is lower. 
Questions on volunteering are asked in all waves. Respondents are asked whether they have 
performed voluntary work in various fields of services such as sports, health, social care provision, 




respondents are also asked the following question: “How many hours a month did you normally spend 
to volunteering (reference last year)?” 
The GINP has fewer covariates. The control variables for explaining life satisfaction and self-
reported health are gender, age, community size, province lived, education level, labor market status, 
number of household members, number of children in the household, marital status, and income from 
employment. 
Of the full sample of (N=6,421)
42
, the analysis is based on 4,847
43
 observations. The observations 
for which donation status (437 cases) and volunteering status (482 cases) information are not 
available are dropped. Observations are dropped if education (7 cases), household size (1 case) 
number of children (1 case) province (2 cases) community size (2 case) are not available.  We also 
dropped observations for which income is missing or where the respondent prefers not to say (642 
cases).  
The analysis from the LISS uses 22,560 observations from 7,564 individuals. Descriptive 
statistics appear in Appendix Table A-1. Overall, 39 % of the respondents say that they donated to a 
social organization. The average amount of donation for respondents who donated is € 45.71. 
Happiness scores are skewed towards the top of the possible answer distribution, with over 90% of the 
sample scoring more than 5 on the happiness scale.  
The GINP analysis uses 4,847 observations from 2,740 individuals. Descriptive statistics appear 
in Appendix Table A-2. Overall, 44% of respondents say they donated in the last two weeks; the 
average donation is € 5.37 and the average donation among donors is €12.14. Subjective health scores 
are skewed towards the top of the possible answer distribution with over 80% responding good, very 
good or excellent.  
The LISS panel is a true probability sample of the households in the Netherlands whereas GINP is 
an opt-in web-panel. Although the pool where GINP respondents were drawn is representative of 
Dutch population with respect to gender, age, level of education, home ownership, household size and 
region, there might still be self-selection. Given that there is growing evidence that opt-in web-based 
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research is not as accurate as research using probability sampling (see especially Yeager et al., 2011), 
we should avoid making claims about effect sizes and generalizability of the finding in a population 
from the GINP analysis. Yet, this does not mean that nonprobability samples have no value. We can 
still document that our variables of interest relate which is sufficient for suggesting the existence of 
warm glow.  
Annual donation from the GINP could be estimated as around € 120 (= €5.37*24). When we 
compare the donation amounts in the LISS panel to the GINP, there is a large discrepancy. Since the 
LISS panel asks the respondents for an annual estimation, there might be a large recall bias in the 
estimate. However, the GINP asks respondents how much they have donated in the previous two 
weeks. This could potentially reduce recall bias considerably. Another check is on the timing of the 
fieldwork. The LISS panel collects pro-social behavior indicators in February whereas the GINP 
conducts the fieldwork in May. According to Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving’s national schedule on 
door to door fundraising, neither February nor May is particularly crowded with door to door 
fundraising. (CBF, 2013) On the other hand, it is also possible that socially engaged people are more 
likely to participate in an opt-in panel, so GINP may overestimate the amount donated.  
Another disadvantage of the LISS panel is that pro-social behavior and happiness are not 
measured simultaneously; by contrast, the GINP measures life satisfaction, self-reported health and 
pro-social behavior simultaneously. An advantage of both surveys is that because they are internet 
based, respondents are less likely to try to present a desirable social image. However, since the GINP 
asks about making a “donation in the last two weeks”, this recency could prompt respondents to 
reproduce a desirable social self-image. Also, fixed effects models deal with respondents’ tendency to 
overstate their donating and volunteering.  
4.5 Proxies for Subjective Wellbeing  
We use happiness, life satisfaction and a subjective health measure as proxies for subjective 
wellbeing. There is no controversy in the literature for using happiness and life satisfaction as 
indicators of subjective wellbeing. But, although subjective health contains psychological health and 




strong possibility of error, partly because a subjective health measure also contains objective health 
information. Therefore, we want to determine whether subjective health is a reasonable measure 
subjective wellbeing. A first argument in defense of self-reported health measures comes from 
evidence that self-reported health has 0.29 correlation with happiness score in the LISS panel and 0.27 
correlation with life-satisfaction score in the GINP.  
Figure 4-1: Self-reported Health and Happiness by Quartiles of the Amount Donated 
 
Source: LISS Panel, 2009-2010 
 
Figure 4-1 shows happiness and subjective health for each quartile of donation amount using 
LISS data. As the figure indicates, happiness and subjective health follow similar patterns for donors. 
Based on our findings, we conclude that subjective health is a reasonable measure of subjective 
wellbeing.  
4.6 Empirical Results  
In the regression models, the happiness score is treated as continuous. All the models report the 
contribution of income to subjective wellbeing measures so that the reader can put the size of the 
effect into the context by comparing the coefficient of income and indicators of donating. For 
studying the impact of donating, regression models with different specifications were used. In the first 
column, amount donated is included in the model whereas the second column includes dummy 



















































behavior. To check different types of non-linear relationships, in the third column, amount donated 
and dummy variable for donated is included whereas in the fourth column, amount donated and its 
squared is included. All the following regression results follow the same structure. 
4.6.1 LISS Panel 
Table 4-1 shows the random effects regression estimates of the effects of pro-social behavior on 
happiness. In the first column, the amount donated is not statistically significantly related to happiness; 
in the second column, donated dummy variable is positively and significantly associated with 
happiness. These results suggest some sort of non-linear relationship between pro-social behavior and 
happiness. In the third column, amount donated and dummy variable for donating are not statistically 
significant at 10% level. The fourth column suggests a concave relationship between amount donated 
and happiness.  
One concern with random-effects results is the presence of unobserved differences in individual 
innate characteristics. Personality traits such as extroversion could be important for happiness, and 
certain characteristics may simultaneously promote happiness and pro-social behavior. Given that 
personality might jointly influence happiness and pro-social behavior, random effects results may be 
unreliable since these innate characteristics are not adequately controlled for in these regressions.  










Std. errors are robust, clustered at individual level, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
The longitudinal structure of the LISS panel allows controlling for unobserved individual 
differences with a fixed effects model. However, the considerable number of respondents already 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  0.00279** 0.00086 0.00242** 0.00247** 
(in € 1000) (2.50) (0.73) (2.22) (2.29) 
Amount donated  0.23848  0.22595 0.85361*** 
(in € 1000) (1.27)  (1.21) (2.78) 
Amount donated squared    -0.89378** 
(in € 1000)    (-2.40) 
Donated dummy  0.05779*** 0.04365*  
  (3.97) (1.76)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
N of Observations 7,697 22,560 7,697 7,697 
Number of id 4,822 7,564 4,822 4,822 
Joint F test p value 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.02 




donated (39% donated money). For fixed effects model to be identified, we need transitions
44
 in 
donating status over time. In the LISS panel, we see that 61.8% of those who donated in one period 
also donated in the next period, while 79% of those who did not donate in one period did not donate in 
the next. We also see considerable variation in donating status: 21% of those who did not donate in 
one period changed their behavior in the next; conversely, 38% of those who donated in the one 
period did not donate in the next.  
The results of fixed effects models are provided in the Table 4-2. The amount donated is not 
statistically significant in the first column whereas, in the second column, dummy variable for 
donating is statistically significant. In the third and fourth column, we do not detect any statistically 
significant relationship between indicators of pro-social behavior and happiness.   
The fixed effects results are interesting; the effect of engaging in donation remains after 
controlling for extensive set of control variables which possibly constitute major shocks to happiness 
such as changes in marital status, income, employment etc. Comparing the coefficient of income and 
donated dummy from column 2 in Table 4-2 suggests that engaging in donating brings much larger 
happiness than increases in income.  









Std. errors are robust, clustered at individual level, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
To decide whether random effect results are justifiable, we conduct the Hausman test. Since all p 
values reported in the last row of Table 4-1 are 0.00, fixed effects results are preferred.  From the 
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 We assume these transitions are exogenous. Yet, even if it is driven by income shocks, it does not pose a 
problem for our estimation methodology since income is included in the set of control variables.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  -0.00202 0.00073 -0.00212 -0.00210 
(in € 1000) (-1.03) (0.37) (-1.03) (-1.03) 
Amount donated  -0.16473  -0.15266 0.08736 
(in € 1000) (-0.91)  (-0.84) (0.25) 
Amount donated squared    -0.33775 
(in € 1000)    (-0.93) 
Donated dummy  0.04501*** 0.02467  
  (2.77) (0.73)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
N of Observations 7,697 22,560 7,697 7,697 
Number of id 4,822 7,564 4,822 4,822 




LISS data, we do not find the amount donated to have any effect on happiness, but engaging in pro-
donation is associated with higher happiness scores (in column 2 of Table 4-2).  
4.6.2 Giving in the Netherlands Panel 
All the regression results presented in this section follow the same structure as described in the 
previous part. Table 4-3 provides random effects estimates of the effect of pro-social behavior on self-
reported health. Here, the self-reported health score is again treated as continuous. Neither the amount 
donated nor dummy variable for donating is statistically significantly related to subjective health in 
the random effects specification.  









                     
Std. errors are robust, clustered at individual level, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 








       
Std. errors are robust, clustered at individual level, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 Without clustering Joint F test p value is 0.93 
46
 Without clustering Joint F test p value is 0.53.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  0.05251*** 0.04698** 0.05249*** 0.05258*** 
(in € 1000) (2.75) (2.46) (2.75) (2.76) 
Amount donated  0.08481  0.07305 -0.06756 
(in € 1000) (0.40)  (0.34) (-0.10) 
Amount donated squared    0.14313 
(in € 1000)    (0.32) 
Donated dummy  0.00360 0.00503  
  (0.16) (0.22)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Observations 4,631 4,847 4,631 4,631 
Number of id 2,655 2,740 2,655 2,655 
Joint F test p value 0.69 0.87 0.91 0.02
45
 
Hausman Test p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  0.03400 0.03759 0.03391 0.03420 
(in € 1000) (1.03) (1.14) (1.03) (1.03) 
Amount donated  0.25044  0.27576 -0.38948 
(in € 1000) (1.12)  (1.24) (-0.47) 
Amount donated squared    0.55449 
(in € 1000)    (1.01) 
Donated dummy  -0.00916 -0.01018  
  (-0.34) (-0.36)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Observations 4,631 4,847 4,631 4,631 
Number of id 2,655 2,740 2,655 2,655 






Table 4-4 provides fixed effects estimates of the effect of pro-social behavior on self-reported 
health. Similar to random effects results, we do not detect any statistically significant relationship 
between indicators of pro-social behavior and self-reported health in any of the four models. To 
decide whether random effect results or fixed effects results are justifiable, we conduct a Hausman 
test. Since all p values reported in the last row of Table 4-3 are 0.00, the fixed effects results are more 
reliable.  
Table 4-5 reports OLS estimates of the effect of pro-social behavior on life satisfaction using the 
2006 wave of the GINP.  Unlike the LISS panel results, in the last two columns where life satisfaction 
is the dependent variable, indicators for donation are not statistically significant in the first two 
columns. The difference might stem from the fact that the LISS looks at annual donations whereas the 
GINP looks at donating in the previous two weeks. Like the LISS random effects results, the fourth 
column suggests a concave relationship between amount donated and life satisfaction.  








Std. errors are robust, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
From the GINP, overall, we do not observe any statistically significant relationship between pro-
social behavior and self-reported health whereas we do see a concave relationship between amount 
donated and life-satisfaction.  
4.6.3 IV Estimates 
Potentially, there could be endogeneity issues for donating, even for the fixed effects results. 
Shocks to happiness might be driving the results that we observe rather than shocks to donation 
increasing happiness. For instance, if a person gets happier, she might want to share it with others in 
the form of higher pro-social behavior. Given this reverse-causality is a concern for our fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  0.12760*** 0.13301*** 0.13291*** 0.13091*** 
(in € 1000) (2.60) (2.74) (2.73) (2.68) 
Amount donated  0.67809  0.35825 8.14134* 
(in € 1000) (0.31)  (0.15) (1.78) 
Amount donated squared    -59.21891** 
(in € 1000)    (-2.39) 
Donated dummy  0.00536 0.00185  
  (0.08) (0.02)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
Observations 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 




results, therefore; in this section, we use instruments for donating. As mentioned in Section 3, we first 
discuss the validity of our instruments.  
Table 4-6: First stage regressions of Donation and Donated Dummy 
Table -6 :   Donation Donation Donated Donated 
 (OLS) (OLS) (Probit) (Probit) 
Door to door collection  0.074 2.727** 0.746*** 1.460*** 
 (0.06) (2.46) (13.30) (11.63) 
Street Collection  -0.447 -1.078 -0.069 -0.168 
 (-0.28) (-0.59) (-0.95) (-0.77) 
Sponsor Campaign  4.631*** 1.905 0.137* 0.301* 
 (2.75) (1.28) (1.74) (1.77) 
Collection in the Church  14.173*** 9.696*** 0.828*** 1.678*** 
 (9.98) (8.04) (11.03) (8.13) 
Collection at work  2.635 0.434 0.337 0.893* 
 (0.60) (0.10) (1.56) (1.69) 
Television campaign  -1.610 2.261* -0.431*** -0.881*** 
 (-0.94) (1.85) (-5.49) (-6.20) 
Direct mail letter  3.598*** 5.809*** -0.091 0.071 
 (2.67) (5.06) (-1.44) (0.54) 
Via internet/e-mail  -2.390 -1.767 -0.131 -0.544** 
 (-0.82) (-0.63) (-1.04) (-2.12) 
Collection during an event  -2.427 4.116 -0.044 0.804 
 (-0.68) (0.89) (-0.27) (1.52) 
Collection via membership organization  1.396 6.589 0.229 0.333 
 (0.34) (1.36) (1.11) (0.65) 
Appeal via advertisement  3.938 -5.654** -0.027 -0.254 
 (1.33) (-2.21) (-0.20) (-1.05) 
Via buying something  3.975** 0.764 0.004 0.127 
 (2.00) (0.44) (0.05) (0.55) 
Via lottery tickets  1.849 8.598*** 0.001 0.470** 
 (1.19) (5.37) (0.01) (2.31) 
Was not asked to donate  -2.867** -0.744 -1.769*** -47 
 (-2.04) (-0.60) (-21.77)  
Baseline controls + + + + 
Dummies for Diseases - + - + 
Test of Ho: the instruments are jointly 0 
F statistic (Chi2) 15.59 17.23 1481.31 215.51 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 4,631 1,305 4,847 994 
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Table 4-6 shows the estimates of the first stage of regression. Column (1) corresponds to a 
specification that controls for all control variables, X. The results indicate that solicitation is an 
important determinant of donation. As discussed earlier, F statistic above roughly 10 makes IV 
inference sufficiently strong. The F statistics presented in the last row of each column clearly exceed 
10 and p values are 0.00; we therefore conclude that we do not have a weak instrument problem. 
When dummy variables for various diseases are added to control for physical health, the F statistic 
remains almost the same (shown in column 2). This is reassuring for the use of our instruments.  
Exclusion restrictions cannot be tested formally. To check the plausibility of our instruments, we 
firstly check whether the observable characteristics of the individuals are balanced over our 
instrument set. That is, we ask to ourselves, in terms of observable characteristics, are individuals who 
are more exposed to solicitation similar to individuals who are less exposed to solicitation. In the IV 
analysis, we use 13 different types of solicitation. For ease of exposition, we document whether 
people exposed to above median number of solicitations are different from people exposed to below 
median solicitations. Table A-3 provides sample means of all controls used in the regression analysis 
by median solicitation status. There is some difference between those who are more solicited and 
those who are less solicited in terms of age, gender, marital status, province of residence, and 
community size. As expected, those who are more solicited have higher income from employment, 
yet the difference between the two columns is not statistically significant. The economics literature 
notes a health gradient of income, and this might be a problem for interpreting self-reported health. 
But income does not tell the whole story. Predicted health scores for people exposed to above median 
solicitations and below median solicitations can be compared to get an overall sense of the direction 
of selection. We have regressed all control variables on self-reported health and obtain predicted 
values using FE, RE and OLS (see bottom lines of Table A-3).  The average predicted health scores 
for above median people are lower than those for below median people no matter which specification 
is used. So charities’ targeting based on income does not appear to select healthier people. 
Given the proliferation of fundraising activities by charities, unsolicited people are not likely to be 
a large group. Nonetheless, Table A-4 indicates, 39% of the respondents were not solicited in the last 




whether the same people are or are not solicited in each wave. We find that 68% of those who are 
solicited in one period are solicited in the next; 32% (521 cases) of those solicited in one period are 
not solicited in the next. Similarly, 52% of those who are not solicited in one period are not solicited 
in the next period; 48 % (365 cases) who are not solicited in one period are solicited in the next. 
Therefore, there is considerable change in respondents’ experiences of solicitation.   
Since we have 13 instruments, we can check over-identifying restrictions, which gives some idea 
on the validity of our instruments. One note of caution here is that the test assumes that at least one 
instrument is valid. As the last row of first two columns in Table 4-7 show, our instruments jointly 
pass the over-identification test at 5% significance level which provides suggestive evidence for the 
exogeneity of our instruments.  
The monotonicity or “no defiers” assumption is another concern. For the purposes of our study, 
monotonicity implies that with one more solicitation, the respondent might be induced to donate, but 
should not give less than her intended amount. In fact, some people might feel discouraged when they 
are solicited. Diamond and Noble (2001) find that in response to frequent solicitations, donors 
develop defense mechanisms, for example, simply throwing away mail requests. Using data from 
some large Dutch charities’ database, Van Diepen, Donkers and Franses (2006) find that additional 
appeals initially generate more donations, but at a certain point, donors become irritated. Like 
exclusion restrictions, the monotonicity assumption cannot be tested formally. However, we can 
convert different types of solicitation into numbers of solicitations
48
 to study potential discouragement 
at higher levels of solicitation. Table A-5 reports regression results for donation by different numbers 
of solicitations compared to a reference category of no solicitation. In column 1, all coefficients are 
positive. In column 2, except for nine solicitations, again all coefficients are positive. In columns 3 
and 4, all coefficients are positive and increasing as well. The results suggest that respondents are not 
less likely to give as a result of increased solicitation. In sum, we find no evidence that the 
monotonicity assumption is implausible.  
Table 4-7 presents fixed effects IV regression results for self-reported health from the GINP. All 
results include full control variables. We also report the overidentifying restrictions test’s (Hansen J 
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statistic) p value and a test of exogeneity (Davidson-MacKinnon test) of pro-social behavior. The 
exogeneity test p value in the first column suggests that the amount donated is endogenous for 
explaining self-reported health. Overidentfying restrictions test p values suggests that our instrument 
set is reasonably valid. Contrary to intuition, in columns 1 and 4, we find a negative impact of the 
amount donated on subjective health, but the coefficient is significant at 10% level.   












Std. errors are robust, clustered at individual level, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table 4-8 shows IV regression results for life satisfaction. All results include full control variables. 
We also report the overidentifying restrictions test’s (Sargan's statistic) p value and a test of 
exogeneity (Wu-Hausman statistic) for pro-social behavior.  In the first, third and fourth models, 
exogeneity test being rejected suggest that pro-social behavior is endogenous for explaining life 
satisfaction. Given that overidentifying restrictions test’s p value is lower than 0.05 in the first, third 
and the fourth column, we conclude that our instruments are reasonably valid. The IV estimates from 
model (1) and model (3) suggest the amount donated influences life satisfaction. However, we find no 
effect of engaging in pro-social behavior on life satisfaction. 
The IV results from model (1) suggest that increasing one’s donations by €1 increases life 
satisfaction by 0.013 points on the 0-7 life satisfaction scale. To make sense of the results, we 
compare the coefficient of income and donation. Column 1 suggests that for equivalent life 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  0.04159 0.03707 0.04160 0.04180 
(in € 1000) (1.23) (1.13) (1.22) (1.24) 
Amount donated  -6.32224*  -6.24935 -6.33451* 
(in € 1000) (-1.79)  (-1.47) (-1.69) 
Amount donated squared    -0.07129 
(in € 1000)    (-0.01) 
Donated dummy  -0.05125 -0.00243  
  (-1.10) (-0.04)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
N of Observations 4,631 4,847 4,631 4,631 
Number of id 2,655 2,740 2,655 2,655 
Overid. Restr. P value 0.79 0.41 0.72 0.72 
Test of exogeneity (p value) 0.04 0.27 0.11 0.15 




satisfaction, increasing one’s donations by €1 corresponds to a €104
49
 increase in one’s employment 
income.  These estimates show the effect of donating on life satisfaction for “compliers”, i.e., the 
effect of donating on life satisfaction for people who donate € 1 more because they were asked to do 
so, but would not donate if they were not asked.  Whether we can generalize the effects of donating on 
life satisfaction to a whole population depends on the characteristics of “compliers”. This group of 
individuals is not likely to be representative of the Dutch population. Thus, IV estimates might not 
reflect the average treatment effect. Therefore, extrapolation is not meaningful. This €104 is put to 
give a feeling about the effect size.  











Std. errors are robust, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
4.7 Robustness Checks 
This section examines the robustness of our baseline IV results to different specifications, 
selection of analysis sample, and selection of instruments.  The results appear in Table 4-9. We first 
control for whether the respondent or anyone close to her experienced various diseases in last 12 
months in our regression model. Eleven dummy variables are generated for 11 diseases.
50
 Since 
subjective health is a crude measure of wellbeing, including various diseases better accounts for 
physical health. One limitation with this approach is that the question about medical problems in last 
12 months was administered only in 2004 and 2006. Therefore, the sample size is smaller and 
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 95% confidence interval of the estimate is (-34.19,  241.13) and   90% confidence interval of the estimate is   
(-12.06, 218.99) 
50
 The diseases are bronchial, cardiovascular, stomach, liver, intestine, kidney, joints, diabetes, nervous system, 
skin, cancer, brain and other diseases. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income  0.12226** 0.13301*** 0.11955** 0.12345** 
(in € 1000) (2.47) (2.77) (2.39) (2.49) 
Amount donated  12.65022**  19.31787** 5.02620 
(in € 1000) (2.03)  (2.03) (0.40) 
Amount donated squared    95.98539 
(in € 1000)    (0.56) 
Donated dummy  0.00577 -0.14116  
  (0.07) (-1.20)  
Baseline Controls + + + + 
N of Observations 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 
Overid. Restr. P value 0.27 0.09 0.35 0.22 
Test of exogeneity (p value) 0.1 0.99 0.02 0.09 




standard errors are higher than in the baseline IV estimates. Including disease dummy variables 
renders the effect of amount donated on subjective health insignificant. For column 2, including 
disease dummy variables does not change the magnitude of the effect of amount donated on life 
satisfaction.  















Std. errors are robust, self-reported health results are clustered at individual level, life satisfaction results are not 
clustered, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
In panel B, to make the results in Table 4-7 and 4-8 comparable, we run model 1 of Table 4-7 
using 2006 wave data only. The relationship between amount donated and self-reported health 
becomes insignificant when 2006 wave data is used. Based on checks from Panel A and B, the results 
displayed in Table 4-7 are not robust to inclusion of physical diseases and using 2006 wave data. 
Therefore, we conclude that subjective health is not a good measure of subjective wellbeing.  
In the baseline model, we use income from employment since it has no categories and it allows 
for marginal effect comparisons. However, it does not reflect household income fully. We have 
household income variable but it is bracketed by €500 increments. We therefore check whether using 
household income rather than income from employment makes any difference. Panel C reports very 
similar estimates to our baseline results.  
Panel D checks the sensitivity of our baseline results to the different subset of instruments. Our 





A. Adding Disease controls 
Amount Donated -3.54097 12.65195** 
(in € 1000) (-0.90) (2.13) 
Observations 1,305 1,305 
B. Using 2006 wave only 
Amount Donated -2.54495 12.65022** 
(in € 1000) (-0.59) (2.03) 
Observations 1,305 1,305 
C. Using household income 
Amount Donated -8.44087* 13.95156** 
(in € 1000) (-1.91) (2.01) 
Observations 3,780 1,104 
D. Using a subset of instruments 
Amount Donated -7.61797* 12.53001* 
(in € 1000) (-1.83) (1.88) 




might easily target through personal soliciting means such as direct post-mail, e-mail, door to door 
collection. Moreover, being solicited through a collection via membership organization might capture 
sociability differences between people since sociable people are more likely to be members of such 
organizations. We discard direct personal solicitations and collection via membership organizations 
and restrict our instrument set to the following; appeal via street collection, sponsor campaign, church 
collection, collection at work, television campaigns, an event, advertisement, buying something, 
lottery tickets, or not solicited.  The results are close to our baseline results but slightly less precise.  
4.8 Heterogeneous effects  
OLS yields the average effect of donating on subjective wellbeing whereas IV estimates yield the 
effect for “compliers”. In our context, “compliers” are those whose donation status is affected by 
solicitation.  IV estimates in the baseline model are the weighted average of effects in each subgroup. 
That is, if the solicitations are very strong predictors of donating within a specific sub-group, that 
subgroup weight is higher in LATE calculation; if solicitations are not related to donations for another 
subgroup, that subgroup is not reflected in IV estimates.  In this section, we check the effects for 
different groups to determine if there are qualitative differences between subgroups. The results are 
reported in Table 4-10.   
Panel A shows the difference in the effects for males and females. Column 1 reports the IV 
estimates of the relationship between the amount donated and self-reported health and column 2 
reports IV estimates of the relationship between the amount donated and life-satisfaction.  The IV 
estimate for females is much higher than for males (6.86 versus -9.96), but the coefficients for both 
are statistically insignificant. Similarly, column 2 suggests that males are less likely to have increased 
life satisfaction as a result of donating extra euro (.006) than females (.011). However, the coefficient 
of amount donated variable is significant in none of the models.   
Panel B present IV estimates for the sample disaggregated by median age: younger than 45, older 
than 45. The effect of donating an extra euro on self-reported health is negative but insignificant both 
for people older than 45 and younger than 45. Column 2 shows the IV estimates for life satisfaction, 




age and positively for those above the median age. The effect for those above the median age is larger, 
and more precisely estimated.  
Panel C show the effects of donating an extra euro decomposed by median income from 
employment. The effect of donating an extra euro on subjective health is much lower in magnitude for 
people above median income compared to people below median income. Yet, none of them are 
statistically significant. The effect of donating an extra euro on life satisfaction is much higher in the 
below median income group than the above median income group (.045 vs. -.017). However, there is 
no statistically discernible difference between below median income and higher median income in 
terms of the effect of donating an extra euro. (see column 2).  






























Std. errors are robust, self-reported health results are clustered at individual level, life satisfaction results are not 
clustered, z-statistics in ( ) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Sociability might be one dimension where heterogeneous effects could be observed. In our 
context, our best proxy for sociability is volunteering since volunteers are generally the ones who are 
members of some social organization. Panel D presents IV estimates of the effects of donating an 
extra euro disaggregated by volunteering status. In column 1, we look at subjective health. Donating 
 Self-Reported Health Life Satisfaction 
A. Gender 
Amount Donated -9.95938 6.18902 
(in € 1000) (-1.17) (0.30) 
Amount Donated*Female 6.85975 11.36736 
 (0.50) (0.37) 
N of Observations 4,631 1,305 
B. Age<= median(45) 
Amount Donated -6.63315 24.68398* 
(in € 1000) (-1.52) (1.88) 
Amount Donated* -4.02980 -37.66508 
(Age <=Median (45)) (-0.36) (-1.06) 
N of Observations 4,631 1,305 
C. Employment Income <= median(450 Euro) 
Amount Donated -8.11978 -16.53513 
(in € 1000) (-1.09) (-0.58) 
Amount Donated* 2.78928 45.19118 
(Emp. Income<=Median (450 Euro)) (0.27) (1.01) 
N of Observations 4,631 1,305 
D. Volunteered 
Amount Donated -8.55449 10.18665 
(in € 1000) (-1.13) (0.50) 
Amount Donated* Volunteer 4.20032 -1.06298 
 (0.35) (-0.03) 




has a negative effect on subjective health for non-volunteers, but a positive effect on volunteers. Yet, 
both are imprecisely estimated. Column 2 suggests that donating increases life-satisfaction for 
volunteers, but it decreases life-satisfaction of non-volunteers. For both volunteers and non-volunteers, 
the effects are statistically insignificant.  
Results from Table 4-10 suggest that largest effects of donation on life satisfaction occur for 
females, older than age 45, below median income, and who have not volunteered in the previous 12 
months.  
4.9 Conclusion  
In this paper, we explore “warm glow” motivation of pro-social behavior. Although “warm glow” 
was first hypothesized at the end of the 1980s in economics literature, no empirical analysis has been 
conducted to measure of the effect of pro-social behavior on happiness in monetary terms.  There is 
an extensive psychology literature on the relationship between happiness and pro-social behavior, but 
these are mainly experimental studies conducted with small groups of students and unrealistic 
donation amounts.   
In our study, we ask whether pro-social behavior makes people happier.  To identify causality, we 
use fixed effects specification and instrumental variables. We use different types of personal 
solicitation as instruments for donating since the literature suggests that solicitation is an effective 
way to induce people to make charitable donations. We use two datasets from the Netherlands: the 
first is five waves of the LISS and the second is four waves of the GINP.  Our results suggest that 
donating increases life satisfaction. However, given the opt-in nature of GINP, the magnitude of the 
effect from GINP may not be extrapolated to the population.   
This result could be useful for policy making. A public policy that fosters donating might increase 
happiness in a society since it contributes to solving problems for needy recipients while yielding 
psychological benefits (i.e., happiness) to the donors. In fact, some organizations seem to be using this 
sort of incentive in their campaigns, as opposed to the classic campaigns involving images of needy 
individuals designed to elicit sympathy and guilt. For instance, American Red Cross tells prospective 




Yet incentivizing behaviors might have detrimental results. If the concept of benefitting from 
donating is introduced, this might destroy extrinsic motivations. For instance, the mere thought of 
money undermines people’s motivation to give (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). For studying 
reciprocity, randomly some potential donors received large gifts from the soliciting charity and some 
potential donors did not receive anything. Potential donors who received large gifts are found to 
donate smaller amounts; those who do not receive gifts are more likely to donate larger amounts (Falk, 
2007). Therefore, further research is needed for clarifying whether advertising these psychological 
benefits of charitable giving undermines the happiness donors receive from giving to others, crowds 
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 Average years of participation for the sample is 2.98 
Table A-1. Data Descriptions, Sample Means, and Standard Deviations LISS Panel: 2007-2012
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Variables Description Mean( Std. DevAll)  (within) Obs (Groups) 
Happy Happiness score, coded so that 0 =totally unhappy, 10 = totally happy 7.58 (1.26) (0.64) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Health Individual assessment of health in the past year; 1 = very poor, 5 = excellent 3.13 (0.75) (0.37) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Long-standing disease Suffering from a long-standing disease, affliction, handicap, or an accident 0.3 (0.46) (0.17) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Days hospitalized Time spent in hospital or a clinic over the past 12 months (days) 0.53 (4.75) (3.67) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Female Gender of the respondent, women = 1 0.54 (0.5) (0.01) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Age  Age in CBS (Statistics Netherlands) categories 4.87 (1.59) (0.22) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Married Civil status, married=1 0.6 (0.49) (0.09) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Never been married Civil status, Never been married=1 0.27 (0.44) (0.06) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Not urban Urban character of place of residence, not urban=1 0.15 (0.36) (0.05) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Slightly to moderately urban Urban character of place of residence, Slightly urban=1 | Moderately urban=1 0.45 (0.5) (0.06) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Employed Paid employment| in family business| freelancer, or self-employed 0.54 (0.5) (0.15) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Income Personal net monthly income in Euros 1595.5 (5644.26) (3040.64) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Education Level of education in CBS (Statistics Netherlands) categories 3.43 (1.51) (0.28) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Household size Number of household members 2.66 (1.31) (0.26) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
# of children Number of living-at-home children in the household 0.86 (1.14) (0.23) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Member Member of a social organization 0.71 (0.45) (0.28) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Participated an event Participated an event in a social organization 0.33 (0.47) (0.34) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Donation amount Monthly donation and gifts (for family, friends, charity etc) expenditure (past 12 months) 37.4 (64.1) (35.76) N = 7697 (n = 4822) 
Donated dummy Dummy for donating 0.39 (0.49) (0.31) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 
Volunteering hours Hours spent on voluntary work per week on average over past 12 months 2.04 (6.07) (3.94) N = 22560 (n = 7564) 




Table A-2: Data Descriptions, Sample Means, and Standard Deviations GIN Panel: 2004-2010
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Variables Description Mean (Std. Dev. All)  (within) Observations (Groups) 
Health Individual assessment of health in the past year; 1 = bad, 5 = excellent 3.16 (0.9) (0.34) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
SWB Are you satisfied with your life? 7 scale (0=No, 1=Yes) 4.31 (1.28) 
 
  N=1,305 
Age  Age in years at interview 46.55 (16.29) (1.31) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Female Gender of the respondent, women = 1 0.52 (0.5) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Married Marital status, married=1 0.68 (0.47) (0.19) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Never been married Marital status, Never been married=1 0.29 (0.45) (0.16) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Household size Number of household members 2.61 (1.26) (0.22) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
# of Kids Number of children 0.84 (1.08) (0.22) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Province Lived Province of residence   
 
  
  Groningen 0.04 (0.19) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Friesland 0.03 (0.18) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Drenthe 0.03 (0.18) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Overijssel 0.06 (0.24) (0.03) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Flevoland 0.03 (0.17) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Gelderland 0.12 (0.32) (0.04) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Utrecht 0.06 (0.25) (0.04) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Noord-Holland 0.15 (0.36) (0.03) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Zuid-Holland 0.21 (0.41) (0.04) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Zeeland 0.03 (0.18) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Noord-Brabant 0.16 (0.36) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  Limburg 0.07 (0.25) (0.02) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Community Size Type of community    
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  <10,000 inhabitants 0.02 (0.13) (0.03) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  10,000 – 20,000 inhabitants  0.11 (0.31) (0.07) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  20,000 – 50,000 inhabitants  0.34 (0.47) (0.1) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  50,000 – 100,000 inhabitants  0.22 (0.42) (0.07) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
  > 100.000  0.31 (0.46) (0.06) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Education Highest completed level of education categories 4.11 (1.68) (0.33) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Employed Has paid job 0.64 (0.48) (0.15) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Income Net monthly Income from employment 772.79 (944.34) (320.5) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Donated dummy Dummy for donating or not in the last two weeks 0.44 (0.5) (0.27) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 
Donation amount Total amount donated in last two weeks 5.27 (29.83) (20.98) N =4,631 (n= 2,655) 
Volunteer dummy Dummy for volunteering or not in the last year 0.43 (0.5) (0.21) N =4,847 (n=2,740) 









Table A-3: Balance of observables by Median  Solicitation (1 solicitation) 
  > Median  <= Median    
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Difference (Std. Error) 
Age  48.94 (16.6) 45.48 (16.04) 3.459 (0.505)*** 
Female 0.54 (0.5) 0.5 (0.5) 0.036 (0.016)** 
Married 0.72 (0.45) 0.67 (0.47) 0.056 (0.014)*** 
Never been married 0.25 (0.43) 0.31 (0.46) -0.053 (0.014)*** 
Household size 2.63 (1.27) 2.6 (1.26) 0.032 (0.039) 
# of Kids 0.83 (1.1) 0.84 (1.08) -0.002 (0.034) 
Province Lived 
      Groningen 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.2) -0.006 (0.006) 
   Friesland 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17) 0.003 (0.005) 
   Drenthe 0.04 (0.2) 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.006)* 
   Overijssel 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.23) 0.023 (0.008)*** 
   Flevoland 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) -0.007 (0.005) 
   Gelderland 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.002 (0.01) 
   Utrecht 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.008 (0.008) 
   Noord-Holland 0.13 (0.34) 0.16 (0.37) -0.03 (0.011)*** 
   Zuid-Holland 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.009 (0.013) 
   Zeeland 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18) 0.006 (0.006) 
   Noord-Brabant 0.15 (0.35) 0.16 (0.37) -0.013 (0.011) 




   <10,000 inhabitants 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.12) 0.007 (0.004)* 
   10,000 – 20,000 inhabitants  0.13 (0.34) 0.1 (0.3) 0.035 (0.01)*** 
   20,000 – 50,000 inhabitants  0.37 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.048 (0.015)*** 
   50,000 – 100,000 inhabitants  0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42) -0.015 (0.013) 
   > 100.000  0.26 (0.44) 0.34 (0.47) -0.075 (0.014)*** 
Education 4.22 (1.65) 4.07 (1.7) 0.15 (0.052)*** 
Employed 0.62 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) -0.032(0.015)** 
Income from employment 783.4 (1003.6) 768.08 (916.93) 15.323 (29.398) 
Volunteer 0.59 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48) 0.226 (0.015)*** 
Predicted Subjective Health (using FE) 3.03 3.2 
 Predicted Subjective Health (using RE) 3.13 3.16 
 Predicted Subjective Health (using OLS) 3.14 3.15 
 Predicted Life Satisfaction (using OLS) 4.39 4.3 








Table A-4 : Distribution of # of Solicitations, GINP 
 Percentage 
No solicitation 38.77 
1 solicitation 30.49 
2 solicitations 14.98 
3 solicitations 8.05 
4 solicitations 4.25 
5 solicitations 1.96 
6 solicitations 0.72 
7 solicitations 0.33 
8 solicitations 0.14 
9 solicitations 0.23 
10 solicitations 0.08 
N of observations 4,847 
 
Table A-5 : Regression Results for Donation by # of solicitation 
 Donation Donation Donated Donated 
     
1 solicitation 4.69141*** 4.18274*** 2.25274*** 3.10345*** 
(ref: no solicitation) (4.46) (4.62) (33.72) (19.39) 
2 solicitation 7.04867*** 7.99458*** 2.32396*** 3.30207*** 
 (5.26) (6.79) (30.45) (18.43) 
3 solicitation 10.86927*** 11.08830*** 2.40552*** 3.31182*** 
 (6.41) (7.75) (26.41) (16.32) 
4 solicitation 15.92029*** 17.78891*** 2.32329*** 3.18291*** 
 (7.11) (7.88) (20.90) (12.27) 
5 solicitation 18.91780*** 19.31779*** 2.46004*** 3.36825*** 
 (5.94) (6.63) (15.55) (9.37) 
6 solicitation 18.88510*** 24.67108*** 2.34976*** 2.97722*** 
 (3.71) (5.68) (9.83) (6.67) 
7 solicitation 8.34907  2.40950***  
 (1.10)  (6.72)  
8 solicitation 11.00450 14.98826 2.31817***  
 (0.99) (1.55) (4.46)  
9 solicitation 22.88525** -2.15704 2.88922***  
 (2.57) (-0.16) (5.04)  
10 solicitation 41.84475***  1.57382**  
 (2.84)  (2.46)  
Full Controls + + + + 
Disease Dummies - + - + 
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